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ABSTRACT 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) contracts tend to have longer contract durations 
compared to other conventional procurement methods. Due to their prolonged nature, 
PPP contracts are extremely prone to contract renegotiation along their lifecycles in 
comparison to other forms of contracts with shorter durations. The common outcomes 
of the renegotiation process may include: increasing the service charges, increasing the 
concession period, or paying a lump sum amount to the party of concern in order to 
maintain a fixed rate of return and keep the return on equity constant. In this research, 
a framework is developed in order to calculate the renegotiation process outcomes and 
facilitate the decision making process of choosing the optimum scenario that preserves 
the rights and the interests of all the stakeholders. This is done using a weighted sum 
model to calculate the weights and ranks of a number of factors influencing the 
stakeholders’ decisions. A Decision Support System (DSS) is developed with the aid 
of Microsoft Excel 2013, Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) programming language, 
and the Precision Tree 5.5 for Excel add-in. The data for the model is obtained from a 
case study of a wastewater treatment plant in Egypt. The results obtained from the 
model are close to the ones obtained from the Independent Financial Expert (IFE) of 
the wastewater treatment plant. 
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 
1 . 1   Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) is recognized as a mechanism that achieves 
cooperation between the public sectors and the private sectors. The agreement is usually 
referred to as the “concession agreement” while the duration of the contract is the 
“concession period”. The durations of PPP contracts tend to be very long compared to 
other conventional delivery methods. The heart of PPP agreements is that the private 
sector finances a PPP project on behalf of the public sector, with the project ownership 
retained by the public sector, retained by the private sector or transferred to the public 
sector at the end of the project. Moreover, PPP agreements also include design, build, 
operate, maintain, develop, buy, or refurbish agreements. PPP contracts have many 
types that are basically combinations of the previously mentioned agreements. 
Examples of PPP contracts are design-build-finance-operate (DBFO) contracts, build-
operate-transfer (BOT) contracts, and build-own-operate (BOO) contracts. 
The choice between the Public Private Partnership delivery method and other 
conventional delivery methods depends on many factors that should be looked at 
thoroughly. One of the main factors is the value for money (VFM). The value for money 
is the difference between the project value that is incurred by the private sector in case 
of choosing the PPP option and the project value if executed by the public sector. 
Although the cost of borrowing for the private sector is usually much higher than the 
cost of borrowing for the public sector, the PPP option, in many cases, may have a 
higher value for money for several reasons, such as the ability of the private sector to 
provide better and more efficient services than the public sector. Private sector know-
how is another reason for choosing a PPP approach. A value for money study should 
be conducted to determine whether the PPP option is more efficient in the long run than 
other procurement methods.  
In order to assess the value for money, the private sector is required to submit a 
financial model along with the bid that includes detailed calculations of all expected 
costs and revenues for the project. On the other hand, the public sector prepares a public 
sector comparator, which is a mirror of the private sector financial model but with the 
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public sector conducting the project by conventional procurement methods. If the 
comparison between the two models proves that the value for money is higher in the 
case of the private sector taking over the project, then the Public Private Partnership 
option is to be chosen. The risk sharing mechanism provided by the PPP method and 
the lower whole life cost of procuring services, which compensates for the higher cost 
of finance in the private sector, are the reasons for the higher value for money in the 
private sector option. Although the PPP option seems to be the expensive option, the 
efficiency and quality provided the private sector usually lead to great savings for the 
public sector. 
  
1 . 2   Importance of PPP 
As stated in the previous section, the public sector should only choose the PPP 
option over conventional procurement methods when the private sector is providing a 
better service with more efficiency; in other words, when the private sector is providing 
a higher value for money (VFM).  
In addition, governments strive to enhance the economic growth of their states. 
This requires enhancing existing services and working on developing beneficial 
strategic projects, such as infrastructure projects. According to the Construction 
Management Association of America (CMAA), Public Private Partnership is one of the 
mechanisms that governments employ to engage private sector financing in the 
development process (The Construction Management Association of America, 2012) .  
The importance of the Public Private Partnership approach is that it supports 
and helps governments achieve their strategic plans in shorter time periods. The private 
financing provided through the Public Private Partnership model helps in allocating 
governmental funds to other strategic projects and services. This allows governments 
to achieve a greater number of goals in a relatively short period of time with high 
efficiency, which boosts the economic growth of the country. 
Moreover, the Public Private Partnership contracts are based on service 
availability, which means that the private sector is not to be paid unless the service is 
being provided to the users according to the contract specifications. In other words, the 
Public Private Partnership mechanism ensures that the private sector is not being paid 
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for an incomplete or insufficient service. Hence, the private sector is keen to provide 
the service on time and according to the contract specifications in order to collect the 
expected revenues as planned. This minimizes the probability of time delays and cost 
overruns in PPP projects tremendously. Furthermore, Public Private Partnership 
contracts can be of great benefit to the end users of a service. In order to maximize its 
revenues, the private sector usually tries to provide the service earlier in the concession 
period in order to increase the operation period, thereby increasing revenue. 
 
1 . 3   Problem Statement 
Despite all of the above benefits, PPP projects are very challenging in terms of 
attracting investors to enter the bidding process. This is due to several factors; one of 
which is the private sector’s fear of the long-term nature of PPP projects, which makes 
it extremely difficult to anticipate contingencies along the projects’ lifecycles. Due to 
the lengthy contract durations, the principles and bases upon which the original PPP 
contract was made may no longer apply; they may be simply altered or totally changed 
as the project evolves. A different set of conditions and situations may appear later in 
the project, making the need for a contract re-equilibrium inevitable, and with re-
equilibrium comes renegotiation. During the renegotiation stage, conflicts may arise 
between the different stakeholders of the project. These lengthy renegotiations become 
full of conflicts that, in some cases, may lead to contract terminations and major losses 
for several parties. However, those conflicts can be avoided through a pre-agreed 
mechanism. Tools are needed to ease the lengthy renegotiation process. This thesis 
provides a tool that facilitates a renegotiation process in which the interests of all parties 
are considered in the final decision. This tool will help in attracting the private sector 
to enter PPP contracts and ensure project continuity and stability of transactions. 
 
1 . 4   Thesis Objective 
Since the PPP contract renegotiation process seems to be an inevitability, the 
goal of this research is to enhance and to support this process in order to make PPP 
contracts more favorable to investors.  
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Typically, there are four re-equilibrium scenarios that appear in a PPP contract: 
increasing the service charges, increasing the concession period, paying a lump sum 
amount to the private sector, or a combination of any of the above. The aim of those 
scenarios is to maintain the contractual internal rate of return of the private sector fixed. 
In order to enhance and to support the renegotiation process and to achieve the thesis 
goal, the research objective is to develop a tool that provides a clear method of selection 
from the common four re-equilibrium scenarios. This tool is a Decision Support System 
model which ensures that the decision is unbiased and robust. In other words, it 
increases transparency and stability of transactions by providing a pre-agreed 
mechanism which enhances mutual trust between the PPP parties. 
The decision to choose from among the above scenarios is affected by many 
factors that exist in both the private and the public sectors. In order to achieve the thesis 
objective and ensure that the optimum decision is taken, a Decision Support System 
(DSS) is developed. This DSS model contains eight modules: a User-Interface Module, 
a Risk Allocation Module, a PPP Valuation Module, a Financial Model Re-equilibrium 
Module, a Scenarios Development Module, a Scenarios Selection Module, a Reports 
Module, and a Sensitivity Analysis Module. The User-Interface Module serves to help 
non-expert users interact easily with the tool, and the Risk Allocation Module reflects 
the contractual allocations of the different projects risks in order to determine the 
portions of the risks that will be considered in the renegotiation process. The PPP 
Valuation Module and the Financial Model Re-equilibrium Module provide a basis for 
the Scenarios Development Module calculations, which the latter develops the different 
re-equilibrium scenarios. The Scenarios Selection Module uses the weighted sum 
model to calculate the weights and the ranks of a number of factors influencing the 
stakeholders’ decisions. The results of the DSS model are presented through the Reports 
Module and the Sensitivity Analysis Module. 
 
1 . 5   Thesis Organization 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter One is the introduction to 
Public Private Partnerships and their importance. It also includes the problem statement 
and the thesis goal and objective.  
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Chapter Two is a literature review of the concept of Public Private Partnerships 
(PPP), the different forms of PPP, the advantages and disadvantages of PPP, the 
different payment mechanisms, the PPP concession period, and the different PPP risks.  
Chapter Three covers the current practice and the contract renegotiation. It 
includes the PPP lifecycle and the components of the PPP financial model. It also 
includes the renegotiation process and its frequency and outcomes. It also discusses the 
tools to facilitate the renegotiation process, such as Decision Support Systems (DSS), 
and examples of their applications in the PPP field.  
Chapter Four presents the methodology of the research and an introduction of 
the framework proposed. It also explains the inputs and outputs of the eight modules of 
the prototype Decision Support System model. 
Chapter Five evaluates the results and provides an analysis of the data obtained 
from the Decision Support System of PPP contracts renegotiation of PPP. It also 
incorporates an analysis of a case study of a wastewater treatment plant in Egypt, and 
the verification and validation of the suggested framework.  
Finally, Chapter Six is the summary and conclusion of the research findings. It 
includes the contributions and the limitations of the research.   
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CHAPTER 2 : LITERATURE REVIEW 
2 . 1   Evolution of the Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
The Canadian Council describes Public Private Partnership (PPP) as “a 
cooperative venture between the public and private sectors, built on the expertise of 
each partner, that best meets clearly defined public needs through the appropriate 
allocation of resources, risks and rewards” (The Canadian Council, 2006). Public 
Private Partnership is, as its name denotes, a partnership between the public sector, 
which is usually represented in the government, and the private sector, which usually 
consists of a consortium of construction and operation companies and investors. In this 
context, the government awards a public project to the private sector in which the 
agreement between the government and the private sector is called a “Concession 
Agreement.” The government is usually referred to as the “Off-taker” while the private 
sector is called the “Concessionaire” (Kriegler, 2006). The contractual period of the 
agreement is also called the “Concession Period,” during which the Concessionaire has 
to fulfill his obligations under the contract. The PPP agreement may include one or 
more of the following components: design, build, finance, operate, maintain, own, 
transfer, lease, develop, buy, or refurbish (Delmon, 2010).  
The first PPP project was in 1782 in France, where a water distribution project 
was awarded to Perrier (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002). Further cooperation between the 
public and the private sectors can be traced to the 1970s, represented in privatizations 
of many projects, especially in Europe, which continued to rise until the late 1980s 
(Hood, 1991). However, the term “PPP” was not used until the 1990s (Davies & 
Eustice, 2005). The use of PPPs began to rise in Europe, specifically in the United 
Kingdom, where the term “PPP” was first used in 1997. The most successful PPP 
programs today are found in the United Kingdom, where the value of the PPP projects 
until 2008 was almost 63 billion British Pounds (Demirag et al, 2010). Furthermore, 
PPPs continued to be used in Portugal, the Netherlands, Ireland, and many other 
European countries. PPPs may also be traced to the 1980s in the United States 
(Agyemang, 2011). As for South America, PPPs were highly evolving in Brazil and 
Mexico. Moreover, Africa and Asia also started using PPPs, mainly in South Africa in 
2001 and in Japan (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2004).  
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Alhomadi, in his PhD dissertation entitled “Public-Private Partnership 
Implementations in Saudi Arabia Infrastructure,” published in 2012, also suggested a 
framework to enhance PPP practices in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by trying to reach 
market maturity and avoid political and legal barriers (Alhomadi, 2012).  
It has been noticed that PPPs emerge in developed countries in earlier stages 
than in developing countries (Guan-Wei, 2010). This proves that the claim that PPPs 
are only suitable for developing countries due to the lack of funds is not accurate. 
Actually, PPPs can be very costly if not studied thoroughly. According to the United 
Nations, the reason is that the government incurs costs, such as administrative and 
transaction costs, in order to prepare bids, negotiate the contract terms, manage the PPP 
contract along the life of the project, and provide monitoring (The United Nations, 
2011). In addition, the cost of borrowing for the private sector is much higher than for 
the public sector.   
Moreover, Viegas, in his paper entitled “Questioning the Need for Full 
Amortization in PPP Contracts for Transport Infrastructure,” claims that, in most cases, 
PPP contracts have a relatively short concession period to reach full amortization, 
which also leads to an increase of transaction costs (Viegas, 2010). To summarize, the 
public sector should only choose the PPP option when the value for money is proven to 
be higher; for instance, if the private sector provides better control and monitoring, 
more advanced operation, or a higher level of know-how. 
 
2 . 2   Forms of PPP 
As mentioned above, PPP arrangement may include one or more of the 
components in Table 1. PPP contracts include one or more of the following 
components: design, build, finance, operate, maintain, own, transfer, lease, develop, 
buy, or refurbish. The combinations of those trades usually vary depending on the level 
of involvement of the private sector, the ownership status of an asset, and the source of 
financing. For instance, if the difference between BOT contracts and BOO contracts is 
the ownership of the asset (Kwak et al, 2009). 
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Table 1: Components of PPP Arrangements 
Form Abbreviation Form Abbreviation Form Abbreviation 
Design (D) Maintain (M) Develop (D) 
Build (B) Own (O) Buy (B) 
Finance (F) Transfer (T) Refurbish (R) 
Operate (O) Lease (L)   
 
PPP is a relatively new delivery method which is still developing and evolving. 
The five most common types of PPP are Operation-Maintenance (OM), Design-Build-
Operate (DBO), Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO), Build-Operate-Transfer 
(BOT), and Build-Own-Operate (BOO). Figure 1 explains the level of involvement of 
the private sector for those common types of PPP where the BOO represents the highest 
level of involvement of the private sector and the OM represent the lowest. 
 
The Build Operate Transfer (BOT) is the most common among the above types; 
it is also referred to as Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO), Design-Build-Operate-Transfer 
(DBOT), Build-Refurbish-Operate-Transfer (BROT), Build-Lease-Transfer (BLT), 
and Turnkey (The United Nations, 2011). Build Operate Transfer (BOT) and its other 
forms mean that “the private sector is responsible for finance, design, construction, 
operation, and maintenance” (Kwak et al, 2009). It also means that the ownership rights 
belong to the public sector as the private sector transfers ownership at the end of the 
Figure 1: Private Sector Involvement (Kwak et al, 2009) 
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project. Another type is Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT), which during the project 
the ownership of the asset belongs to the private sector; however, at the end of the 
contract, the ownership is transferred to the public sector which can also be another 
name for the BOT contracts. 
On the other hand, Broadbent in his paper entitled “PPPs: Nature, Development 
and unanswered Questions”, claims that the ownership of the asset during the execution 
of a BOT contracts belong to the private sector as well (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2004). 
Unlike BOT, Build-Own-Operate (BOO) is a PPP type in which the ownership of the 
asset is transferred to the private sector.  
In addition, Menendez, in his report entitled “Constrains and Opportunities for 
PPP Transport Projects,” states that during Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) and 
Design-Build-Operate (DBO) contracts, the ownership of the asset remains with the 
public sector, which increases the level of involvement of the public sector (Menendez, 
1998).  
Public Finance Initiative (PFI) is another type of PPP, wherein the private sector 
finances the delivery of an improved specific service for the government, and 
ownership remains with the public sector, as well. In his paper entitled “Contract Issues 
and Financing in PPP/PFI,” Palmer conducts a comparison between Design-Build-
Finance-Operate (DBFO) and Design-Build-Operate (DBO) contracts. The paper 
defines the criteria based upon which the public sector decides whether to use DBO or 
DBFO contracts. The criteria depend on both the nature of the project and the 
availability of funds in the public treasury of a country. Because of the continuous 
evolution of new technologies and changing customer needs, a quick response is 
required. Palmer recommends in such cases to avoid using the DBFO contracts, as the 
financing component of this contract requires additional agreements and protocols with 
a financing party, such as a bank. This additional link in the PPP chain would require 
additional approvals in order to adjust any part of the PPP process to adhere to 
technological changes. It would be more efficient to have fewer approvals in such cases. 
Moreover, Palmer states that the DBO is better than the DBFO approach provided that 
the government has sufficient funds to bear the project costs (Palmer, 2000). 
The various types of PPPs can constitute either an opportunity or a risk for both 
the public and the private sectors, as each type has advantages and disadvantages that 
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may be reversed depending on the nature of the PPP project. For example, opting for a 
Build-Own-Operate (BOO) approach for a strategic project such as a nuclear plant 
could have numerous disadvantages, as the public sector would hand the ownership of 
such an important facility to the private sector. Hence, advantages and disadvantages 
of a PPP should be studied thoroughly in order to ensure its feasibility for a certain 
project. 
 
2 . 3   Advantages and Disadvantages of PPP 
Almost all of the other PPP advantages lead to the same conclusion: a better 
value for money (VFM). According to Skanska in his report entitled “European 
Commission Second International Workshop on PPPs,” the Net Present Value (NPV) 
of a public project consists of the whole life cost of procuring services, the cost of 
finance, and the cost of risks retained by the public sector, as shown in Figure 2 
(Skanska, 2004). When going for the PPP option, the public sector reduces the whole 
life cost of procuring services and the cost of risks retained by the public sector; 
however, it increases the cost of finance.  
According to Guan-Wei in his PhD dissertation entitled “The Bids-Evaluation 
Model Development and Application for PPP Transport Projects: A Project Risk 
Modeling Framework,” in order to make a PPP more beneficial, a balance should be 
obtained to ensure that the summation of all the benefits and drawbacks achieves, in 
the end, a positive value for the public sector: the value for money (Guan-Wei, 2010).   
Herpen, in his paper entitled “Public Private Partnerships, the Advantages and 
Disadvantages Examined,” states that the value for money is achieved due to several 
factors. First, instead of the public sector bearing all the risks, the PPP approach allows 
the public sector to transfer many risks to the private sector; moreover, PPP contracts 
are output-based contracts, meaning that the private sector shall only be paid when 
providing the service as per the specifications required. In addition, the private sector 
is obliged to provide the public sector with the whole life cost of the project in advance, 
despite the long-term nature of the PPP project. Due to all of the above, PPPs promote 
cost efficiencies and provide improved service (Herpen, 2002).  
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Figure 2: Value for Money (VFM) of PPP (Skanska, 2004) 
 
Archer and Cameron, in their paper entitled “Making Public Private 
Partnerships Work,” published results of a survey conducted by the National Audit 
Office (NAO) of the United Kingdom. The survey included 37 PPP projects. Cost 
overruns and time delays were estimated. The results indicated that almost 75 percent 
of conventional procured projects suffer from cost overruns while less than 25 percent 
of PPP projects suffer from cost overruns. The study also found that almost 24 percent 
of PPP projects suffer from time delays. The conclusion showed that PPPs are more 
efficient in terms of time and cost than conventional procurement methods (Archer & 
Cameron, 2003). 
In its report entitled “An Owner’s Guide to Project Delivery Methods,” The 
Construction Management Association of America states that one of the main 
advantages of PPPs are that they delay the need of the public sector to use the funds in 
the public treasury. In other words, they allow the public sector to use the capital in the 
public treasury for other projects and minimize the need for raising taxes to meet the 
demands of infrastructure projects. However, the government should be very careful 
when planning for future spending, considering the operation costs of PPP projects after 
they are transferred to the government. Another advantage of PPPs are their quick 
responses to customers’ needs, which are usually more efficient in the case of the user-
fees payment method. PPPs also provide an incentive and high potential for early 
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delivery of the service, as the private sector wants to maximize the operation period in 
order to obtain higher profits. Many governments nowadays encourage the PPP option, 
creating an atmosphere of mutual cooperation and a better work environment for the 
private sector investors, which is another main advantage. The PPP option provides a 
non-depleting source of resources to meet the public demand for new services and 
infrastructure projects (The Construction Management Association of America, 2012). 
The value for money (VFM) can be a great advantage of PPPs, as shown above; 
however, if not studied thoroughly, it can be also a major disadvantage if the 
conventional procurement methods become more efficient. PPPs have many additional 
costs that the public sector must bear, such as tendering, administration and transaction 
costs. Moreover, poor drafting of contract terms can lead to renegotiation, resulting in 
the private sector being overpaid for the service. Again, the cost of borrowing for the 
private sector is much higher than for the Public Sector, which also should be weighed 
against the other gains of PPPs. 
Katz, in his paper entitled “Financing Infrastructure Projects: Public Private 
Partnerships (PPPs),” states that due to the length of PPP contracts, such contracts are 
usually prone to renegotiation as a result of various unexpected contingencies that 
might occur along the project lifecycle. In addition, it is very difficult to control the 
performance of the private sector and its quick response to growing demand, especially 
when the private sector is paid by the government rather than the user fees method. This 
may lead to political issues due to the dissatisfaction of the service users. A PPP contract 
may lose efficiency with time due to the fact that the project cannot be re-tendered, 
which diminishes competition and the incentive to provide a better service (Katz, 2006). 
In his report entitled “Granting Renegotiation Infrastructure Concessions: 
Doing It Right”, Guasch states that the aim of PPPs is to encourage better private sector 
quality and performance for the benefit of users. In the long run, the private sector 
records efficiency gains that should be passed to the users in the form of lower tariffs. 
However, it has been shown in different studies that these efficiency gains have a weak 
correlation with tariffs and usually reflect on a minor portion of them. According to 
Guasch, the efficiency gains are reflected only in 1 percent or less of the tariff value. In 
some cases, the government chooses to obtain those efficiency gains indirectly by 
increasing the taxes (Guasch L. , 2004). 
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In summary, the idea of a PPP is to combine the expertise and resources of the 
public and the private sectors in order to reach efficiency and value for money (VFM), 
yet the above disadvantages along with insufficient feasibility studies and poor 
decisions can turn a PPP from an advantageous method of delivering services to the 
public sector into leading to undesired results. 
 
2 . 4   PPP Payment Mechanisms 
Payments in PPP contracts are made based on the service availability, or what 
is called “verifiable outcomes,” and are not paid against the cost of materials or the 
inputs of the process like other conventional contracts. In PPP project types where the 
private sector performs the construction agreement, it will not be paid until the service 
becomes available. Sometimes third parties are used to measure the output for the 
purpose of the payment. The public sector has to be very careful to define clear tools to 
measure the performance of PPP projects, especially if the output service is not as easy 
to quantify or verify. Surveys may be conducted to measure the performance of a 
project (Noble, 2006). 
 
2 . 4 . 1   User Charges 
This mechanism is used when the private sector is bearing the demand risk and, 
therefore, is collecting the payments or revenues from the users directly, as in the case 
of highways, bridges, or tunnel tolls. In determining the appropriate user charges, the 
public sector should apply tariffs in a manner that ensures the project will earn sufficient 
revenues to guarantee the bankability of the project. Sometimes it is necessary for the 
public sector to provide some help to the private sector to maintain the bankability of 
the project, such as providing a share of the capital expenditures (Capex) or grants. 
Another method is to provide revenue support, which is a way to support the private 
sector in cases of low demand during certain periods. Other governments may help with 
the debt guarantees in case of a major drop in demand that prevents the private sector 
from paying the debt at some stage (Noble, 2006).  
In his paper “Contractual Structures and Risk Allocation and Mitigation in the 
Context of Public Private Partnerships in the Health Sector,” Stemmer concluded that 
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the public sector has to be very careful when providing subvention, as fixed subventions 
are not recommended. In some cases, subventions decrease the performance of the 
private sector as it will transfer some of the demand risks back to the public sector. 
Hence, subventions should always be linked to the performance of the private sector. 
In some cases, the public sector may try to limit private sector profits when it is proven 
that the revenues are exceeding a certain boundary. One of the techniques of limiting 
the revenues is sharing surplus revenue, especially if the public sector is providing 
subventions. Another technique is capping revenues, but this may limit the private 
sector from enhancing the service and attracting more users (Stemmer, 2008). 
 
2 . 4 . 2   Usage Payment 
The payment in this case is provided by the public sector itself to the private 
sector for projects where it is known that the demand is not high enough to cover the 
debt and provide sufficient revenues to the private sector. In order to do that, a 
measurement tool has to be agreed upon between the two parties to measure the 
performance. If performance measures are not linked to the payment, the demand risk 
will be transferred to the public sector, which is not desirable and this makes it difficult 
to ensure that the private sector has an incentive to maintain the quality of the service 
until the end of the operation period. If the payments are made by users directly, this 
may be shown as a measure of the quality of the service itself. Therefore, if the payment 
is made by the government, the government has to take all necessary precautions to 
ensure that the service is delivered in a proper way, as mentioned above (Noble, 2006). 
 
2 . 4 . 3   Availability Payment 
The contract should mention clearly the definition of the service availability in 
order for the public sector to start paying the private sector for the service. Deductions 
are made in case of service unavailability. In addition, in some contracts it is stated that 
if within a certain period the private sector is able to rectify the service availability, 
minor or no deductions shall be applied. On the contrary, a provision in the contract is 
added for bonuses in case the private sector exceeds or enhances the performance level 
agreed upon with the public sector. 
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Sharma, in his PhD dissertation entitled “Design of Availability Payment 
Mechanism for Public Private Partnerships,” developed a model that helps with 
designing availability payment for PPP contracts. In such contracts, the public sector 
usually defines an upper limit to the availability payment. Sharma’s model calculates 
this upper limit, which guarantees that the public sector achieves its cost saving target 
and, at the same time, assures the re-equilibrium of the financial state of the private 
sector. The model also considers the different uncertainties and the financial state of 
the private sector (Sharma, 2012). 
 
2 . 4 . 4   Monitoring and Control of Unplanned Payments in PPP Projects 
In order to apply the above, the private sector has to introduce a quality 
management system to the project while the public sector shall review and monitor this 
system in order to ensure the service availability and performance. As this is the case 
in many countries, government officials may not be qualified or motivated enough to 
apply such monitoring systems; hence, it is recommended to use an external 
organization to perform the monitoring tasks for the public sector. This external 
organization shall be paid by the public sector to avoid any conflict of interest that could 
arise if it is paid by the private sector. 
Spagnolo et al, in the report entitled “Contract Design in Public-Private 
Partnerships,” states that in some projects, it is allowed for part of the facility to be 
rented to a third party, which will constitute secondary revenue for the private sector. 
If this has been accounted for in the bid price, then the private sector will earn such 
revenue. However, if this is not the case, then the revenue shall be shared between the 
public and the private sectors. Another source of unplanned revenue are price variations 
to protect the private sector from bearing the risk of cost overruns, which prevent the 
price from maximizing as a result of a huge mark up to account for such contingency. 
In any case, the service charge should always be adjusted to ensure that it will cover 
the financial obligations of the private sector. The contract has to state which “price 
index” will be used when calculating the inflation changes; moreover, it should define 
the “proportion of the tariff” or the part of the unitary payment to be affected by the 
inflation changes. On the other hand, the public sector may require a provision in the 
contract to protect itself when market prices decrease. (Spagnolo et al, 2007). 
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2 . 5   PPP Concession Period 
As it is important to design the contract to be flexible enough to absorb changes 
and modifications in the project, as well as allow for an extension in the concession 
period to absorb the effects of such changes.  
Meunier and Quinet, in their paper entitled “Tips and Pitfalls in PPP Transport 
Projects” stated that the contract duration should be designed very carefully in order to 
avoid unnecessary long concession periods, which constitute a greater risk for the 
private sector to forecast the future demand versus cost. In the case of a unitary payment 
mechanism, when determining the contract duration, it has to be connected with the 
amount of investment by the private sector and the unitary payments versus the residual 
value of the project assets. For example, if project assets will be given to the private 
sector after the completion of the project, then the duration of the contract should be 
relatively shorter in order to account for the residual value of the asset. In the case of a 
user charges payment mechanism, the contract duration is greatly connected with the 
amount of revenues expected along the project life. For contracts in which the cost of 
the projects depends on the condition of the assets and cannot be determined at the 
contract design stage, it is recommended to lengthen the contract duration to encourage 
the private sector to take on the project. However, in some countries there exist rules 
and regulations to limit the contract durations to certain number of years; for instance, 
in Chile, as well as Egypt, the concession period shall not exceed 30 years while in Italy 
it shall not exceed 50 years (Meunier & Quinet, 2010). 
Albalate and Bel propose variable term contracts for PPP projects in their paper 
entitled “Regulating Concessions of Toll Motorways: An Empirical Study on Fixed vs. 
Variable Term Contracts.” Albalate and Bel encourage the use of variable term 
contracts over the ordinary term contracts. Variable term contracts are contracts in 
which the concession period is not defined by a limited number of years but by certain 
conditions. The type that Albalate and Bel suggest is the Least Present Value of 
Revenue (LPVR) or the Least Present Value of Net Revenue (LPVNR). In those 
contracts, the concessionaire delivers the project back to the public sector after reaching 
a certain discounted value of revenue. This type of contract eliminates many 
disadvantages of the ordinary PPP contracts and tremendously minimizes the 
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probability of renegotiation. Despite the effectiveness of variable term contracts, they 
are rarely used in PPP projects nowadays (Albalate & Bel, 2009).  
Bel et al, in their paper entitled “Public-Private Partnerships: Infrastructure, 
Transportation and Local Services,” suggested that where the market is small with a 
low number of competitors, it is ideal to offer long contract durations in order to 
encourage  a competitive atmosphere rather than internal agreements between the 
different competitors. On the other hand, if the market is unlikely to unify and there 
exists a spirit of competition between the different bidders, it is better to use short-term 
contracts, as these encourage originality and innovation, which usually lead to cost 
savings and quality enhancement. Another incentive that can be used is contract 
renewal based on the private sector performance. The shorter the contract duration, the 
greater the frequency of renewal, which constitutes a larger incentive for the private 
sector (Bel et al, 2013). 
Vassallo, in his paper entitled “Traffic Risk Mitigation in Highway Concession 
Projects: The Experience of Chile,” stated that the contract duration can be determined 
on the basis of the Least Present Value of Revenue (LPVR). In this case, when the 
LPVR is reached, the contract expires automatically. He concluded that some bidding 
options, such as the Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG) and the Revenue Distribution 
Mechanism (RDM) as well as the Least Present Value of Revenue (LPVR), decrease 
the probability of renegotiation (Vassallo, 2006). 
In his PhD dissertation entitled “A Real Options Model for the Financial 
Valuation of Infrastructure Systems under Uncertainty,” Kashani developed a model 
that estimates the value of the above measures. In his model, he was able to estimate a 
value for the Minimum Revenue Guarantee (MRG), or a price cap to be defined by the 
public sector. Kashani's measures took the demand risk into consideration and used 
Monte Carlo simulation with the aid of stochastic processes to develop his model 
(Kashani, 2012). 
Shen et al, in their paper entitled “Alternative Concession Model for Build 
Operate Transfer Contract Projects,” produced a model that can give an estimate of the 
optimum concession period in such contracts. Their model balances both the investor 
and the government interests, which makes this type of contract more efficient and 
appealing (Shen et al, 2002). Shen and Wu improved the model in their paper titled 
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“Risk Concession Model for Build/Operate/Transfer Contract Projects.” In this model, 
they focused on different risks and their effects on the concession period. An investor 
has to account for the risks that may cause any delay or cost overrun to the project and 
increase the concession period to account for those risks. They used a hypothetical case 
to apply the project, which can be very misleading in terms of adjusting the variables 
to get the desired results. Because cash flows of a project cannot be a deterministic 
value, Shen et al used Monte Carlo simulation to model the effect of the different risks 
on the project cash flow (Shen & Wu, 2005).  
In “The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public 
Sector,” Gagnepain et al also stress the importance of increasing the concession period 
in order to make sure that the investor is getting fair returns on investment. This will 
minimize the probability of a contract renegotiation later in the project (Gagnepain et 
al, 2013). 
Liou and Huang, in their paper entitled “Automated Approach to Negotiations 
of BOT Contracts with the Consideration of Project Risk,” used the Monte Carlo 
simulation to produce a contractual-negotiation model. They also studied how the 
model would vary in case of high and low risk profiles. A conclusion was reached that 
a sponsor or an investor should be given a longer concession period in the case of a 
high risk profile project (Liou & Huang, 2008). 
 
2 . 6   PPP Projects Risks 
One of the major triggers of PPP renegotiation is the inability to predict and 
account for all the contingencies in the contract design stage; hence, PPP risks should 
be studied carefully. In their Procedure Manual, the Water Services Training Group in 
Ireland states that one of the main advantages of the Public Private Partnership approach 
is that it provides a better risk allocation approach for both the private sector and the 
government. Allocating risks to the party that is able to mitigate them is a good practice 
to help in attracting the private sector to engage in PPP projects. Transferring too many 
risks to the private sector may not be in favor of the PPP project and may cause the 
private sector to fail to meet the obligations of the contract. Moreover, some risks 
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cannot be transferred to the private sector, such as the political risks in the case that the 
service did not satisfy public needs (Water Services Training Group, 2012). 
PPP risks have major effect on deciding whether or not to choose the PPP 
delivery method. Checherita, in her PhD dissertation entitled “A Macroeconomic 
Analysis of Investment under Public-Private Partnerships and its Policy Implications - 
the Case of Developing Countries,” has developed a model to help in deciding whether 
to invest in a PPP project or not. The conclusion of the study was that some risks, such 
as exchange rates and public investment risks, have a great impact on the choice to 
invest in a PPP. Other factors affecting the decision were the degree of experience of 
the different parties, the economic condition of a country, and the degree of aid provided 
by the public sector (Checherita C. , 2009). 
 
2 . 6 . 1   PPP Risk Management Process 
2 . 6 . 1 . 1   PPP Risk Identification 
In his paper entitled “Risks and Guarantees in BOT Tender”, Tiong stated that, 
“Unpredictability is the kiss of death in BOT project financing” (Tiong, 1995). In order 
to minimize unpredictability, great concern should be given to the risk identification 
phase in risk management. In order for the risks to be identified, they have to be 
categorized either by project phases or by their type. In general, PPP project phases 
consists of bid phase, negotiation with preferred bidders, construction phase, 
operational phase, and transfer of asset phase. Risks can also be defined by their type, 
such as site risk, design, construction and commissioning risk, sponsor and financial 
risk, operating risk, market risk, network and interface risk, industrial relations risk, 
legislative and government policy risk, force majeure risk, asset ownership risk, etc.  
Chan et al published a paper entitled “Potential Obstacles to Successful 
Implementation of Public-Private Partnerships in Beijing and the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region.” In their paper, Chan et al identified the main risks affecting 
the PPP projects in Beijing and Hong Kong and compared them with the ones in the 
United Kingdom. They conducted a survey to identify the top risks in the PPP field. 
The results of the survey were that two of the major risks in both Beijing and Hong 
Kong are the long period of renegotiation and the delays due to political debate. One of 
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the top risks in Beijing was also the lack of experience and sufficient skills for managing 
PPPs, while in Hong Kong, it was the low number of concessions reaching the award 
phase (Chan et al, 2010). 
  
2 . 6 . 1 . 2   Risk Assessment 
Risks have to be assessed and studied carefully in order to allocate them to the 
suitable party and choose a suitable risk mitigation mechanism. The likelihood of the 
occurrence of a risk should be calculated carefully. This is not an absolute figure, as it 
is affected by many factors, one of which is the question of whether this risk is to be 
allocated to the public or the private sector. Another factor to consider is the effect of 
such risk if it materializes. In other words, some risks may have a high probability of 
occurrence, yet they have such a minor effect on the project that they can be neglected. 
Fischer et al, in their paper entitled “An Integrated Risk Management System (IRMS) 
for PPP Projects,” stated that the risk management process is very complicated, 
especially in PPP projects. They conducted a questionnaire of 53 German PPP experts 
to evaluate the risk management status. The result showed that industry practitioners 
prefer to use qualitative techniques of risk assessment over more complicated 
techniques, such as simulation methods. Moreover, industry experts do not rely totally 
on the results of risk assessment due to the lack of transparency and accuracy (Fischer 
et al, 2010).   
Tolani, in his PhD dissertation entitled, “An Examination of Risk Perceptions 
and Allocation Preferences in Public-Private Partnerships in Nigeria,” conducted a 
questionnaire aiming to compare the comprehension of PPP risks by the private sector, 
the public sector and the bank. Tolani argued that the different parties of a PPP project 
perceive risks differently. However, the questionnaire results indicated that apart from 
poor workmanship risk, the three players had the same comprehension of the different 
PPP risks in Nigeria. The researcher conducted the same process in China and obtained 
the same result except for the corruption risk. This indicates that the private sector, the 
public sector and the bank have almost the same risk assessment of the different PPP 
risks (Tolani, 2013). 
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In their paper entitled “Evaluating the Risks of Public Private Partnerships for 
Infrastructure Projects,” Grimsey and Lewis stress the need for assessing risks in PPP 
projects. Grimsey and Lewis developed a computer-aided model providing a 
framework for the process of evaluating the different risks from the perspective of the 
public sector, the private sector, and the lenders. They applied their framework to a case 
study of a wastewater treatment plant in Scotland and found that the objectives of the 
framework were achieved (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002). 
On the other hand, from the lender’s point of view, many risks are considered 
important. Demirag et al, in their paper entitled “Risks and Financing of PPP: 
Perspectives from the Financiers,” study PPP risks from the perspective of the lender. 
They conducted a survey sent to 109 experts in PPP debt and equity, and almost 40 
percent responded. The survey results showed that the lenders usually prefer that all 
risks are either insured or allocated. Moreover, the survey also proved that lenders 
usually go for an investment environment that they are aware of or worked in before, 
whether by working with the same institutions, the same type of projects, or in the same 
region. (Demirag et al, 2011). 
 
2 . 6 . 1 . 3   Risk Allocation 
The goal of risk allocation is to reach the optimum value of the project; in other 
words, the lowest contract price. If risks are allocated to the private sector while the 
public sector is the party who can control and predict such risks, then the private sector 
would have a very high contingency, resulting in an unnecessary increase in the bid 
price. This happens first by choosing the type of contract that would help in assigning 
the right risks to the party that is best suited to handle such risk. “Proactive contracting” 
is a term used by Tieva and Junnonen in their paper entitled “Proactive Contracting in 
Finnish PPP Projects,” which means that the allocation criteria of PPP risks should be 
defined in clear terms in the PPP contract. The allocation criteria may include 
insurances, securities, or guarantees. An example of allocation of political risk and the 
necessity of obtaining governmental guarantees was used by Tieva and Junnonen 
(Tieva & Junnonen, 2009). 
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In the Partnership Victoria model, the government only pays the private sector 
for the output, which means that all risks that have to do with construction are allocated 
to the private sector. Given the above, governments should also take over the risks that 
they can handle the best in order to reach the optimal risk allocations. In the case of 
risks over which neither party has control, it is better to go with a shared approach in 
order to avoid high risk premiums if the full risk allocated to the private sector. In 
general, it should be allocated to the party which can best mitigate the rick. It is also 
recommended to relate the payment mechanism to the risk allocation, meaning that, 
“No service, No payment.” In other words, payments should not start before the service 
is delivered to users, as this is an incentive for the private sector to complete the project 
according to the specifications of the government (Department of Treasury and 
Finance, 2001).  
Ke et al, in their paper entitled “Preferred Risk Allocation in China's Public-
Private Partnership,” focused on China’s Private Public Partnership projects, and how 
the different risks should be allocated to the different contractual parties. The research 
was conducted with the help of a two-round Delphi survey. Based on the survey results, 
37 risks were defined, and only one risk should be totally allocated to the government: 
the risk of ‘‘expropriation and nationalization.” Twelve risks are mostly allocated to the 
public sector including, ‘‘land acquisition” and ‘‘approval and permit.” Fourteen risks 
are shared equally between the public and the private sectors including 
’‘ground/weather conditions” and ‘‘force majeure” (Ke et al, 2010).  
In “VFM and Risk Allocation Models in Construction PPP Projects” Li et al 
conducted a survey to gather results of both qualitative and quantitative risk allocation 
of PPP risks. In other words, it gathers information of the different types of PPP risks 
and the percentages of the risks allocated to the private sector, the public sector, or 
shared (Li et al, 2001). 
Li et al published another paper entitled “The Allocation of Risk in PPP/PFI 
Construction Projects in the UK” in 2005. Li et al studied the Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI) which has the advantages of Private Public Partnership, yet it also transfers risk 
away from the public sector. A survey was conducted to define which risks should be 
allocated to the public sector and which to the investor. Risks were categorized into 
three categories: macro-level risks, such as macroeconomic risks; meso-level risks such 
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as construction and operation risks; and micro-level risks, such as coordination risks. 
Macro and micro-level risks are advised to be allocated to the public sector or shared 
with the private sector. While PPP/PFI projects usually contain meso-level risks, it is 
advised to allocate them to the private sector (Li et al, 2005). 
Badran, in her thesis entitled “Risk Analysis and Contract Management for 
Public Private Partnership Projects in Egypt,” also discussed the allocation of the 
different PPP risks in Egypt. Badran gathered 59 risks from the academic literature and 
conducted a survey to define the critical risk groups. She also developed a risk matrix 
with the different PPP risks and their recommended allocations (Badran, 2013).  
Finally, it has been advocated that PPP risk allocation is not a straightforward 
decision. In their paper entitled “Perceived Risk Allocation in Public-Private-Partnered 
(PPP) Water Supply Projects in Indonesia,” Wibowo and Mohamed conducted a survey 
aiming to gather experts’ opinions about the allocation of the different risks of the water 
services-related PPP projects. The survey included 39 project risks that were grouped 
in six risk categories. Thirty-four experts who hold managerial positions in the water 
services-related companies responded to the questionnaire. The results were totally 
different from one questionnaire to the other, reflecting a large variance of who should 
bear certain risks. The risk transfer is one of the huge advantages of PPP; however, risk 
allocation requires further study in order to guarantee the success of PPP projects 
(Wibowo & Mohamed, 2008). 
 
2 . 6 . 1 . 4   Risk Mitigation 
The goal of risk mitigation is to reduce both the probability of a risk occurrence 
and the effect on different contractual parties if a risk materializes. Both the private and 
the public sectors have different mitigation mechanisms. The private sector 
mechanisms include passing the risks to a third party. As an example, the 
concessionaire usually passes the design and construction risks to a design and build 
contractor. An example of another famous mechanism is insurance. The public sector 
mechanisms are similar to those of the private sector. The public sector usually appoints 
different consultants or advisors in the different fields of the project, such as legal, 
financial, and technical consultants, (Delmon, 2010).  
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Li et al published another paper entitled “Risk Treatment Preferences for 
PPP/PFI Construction Projects in the UK” in 2004. In their paper, Li et al discuss the 
different risk mitigation techniques. They recommend the use of risk retention and risk 
transfer over the use of risk avoidance and risk reduction when dealing with PPP risks 
(Li et al, 2004). 
 
2 . 6 . 1 . 5   Monitoring and Review 
Monitoring and reviewing is the most important phase of risk management, as 
it ensures the effectiveness of the plan. It is significant to ensure that the risk 
management plan expresses all risks that can be identified in a certain project. 
Moreover, the process should not only guarantee that the mitigation plans are being 
followed and identify critical phases and deadlines, but also ensure its effectiveness and 
viability along the different phases of the project. In addition, the plan should 
continuously update the probabilities and impacts of each risk, and calculate its 
mitigation costs, as well. The reviewing process should also monitor the resources that 
should be available at certain times to deal with the risks (Noble, 2006). 
 
2 . 6 . 2   Common Types of PPP Risks and Their Preferred Allocations 
There are many types of risks, some of which are associated with a specific 
project and others which apply to almost any project. Both types should be considered 
when preparing the risk matrix for a PPP project. 
 
2 . 6 . 2 . 1   Statutory Risk  
Examples of statutory risks are land acquisition, permits, and compensations in 
the case of the land not being owned by the government. The public sector is the best 
party to control such risk, more so than the private sector, as in most cases, the public 
sector will carry out such tasks before the tender stage. In some countries, such as Latin 
America, the public sector cannot bear the statutory risks as it lacks the know-how and 
the technical capabilities to be competent to carry such risks. On the other hand, the 
private sector has no control over such risks; it will have to increase the contingency 
25 
 
allowance, which increases the unitary charges. In this case, it is optimum for the public 
sector to carry statutory risk. Li et al introduce the case study of YD2nd Tunnel in 
Shanghai, China in their paper “The Allocation of Risk in PPP/PFI Constructions 
Projects in the UK.” During the mentioned project, the public sector chose to carry the 
statutory risk. Li et al recommend that the public sector carries the statutory risks, 
whether by using “in house” expertise or an external consultant, but bearing in mind 
that, at some point in time, the public sector should gain knowledge from such 
consultant in order to better handle the risks on its own (Li et al 2005).  
 
2 . 6 . 2 . 2   Legislative Risk   
Legislative risk is the risk that the government will change a law or a policy that 
will impact the project in a negative way. According to Dong, the government chooses 
to allocate this risk to the private sector. The private sector might deal with those 
changes in laws and minimize their effect on the project by passing the effect of such 
risk to the users through increasing the service charges. However, if the service is 
provided by the government itself, the private sector would opt to share the legislative 
risk with the public sector (Dong, 2010). 
 
2 . 6 . 2 . 3   Output Specifications Risk  
Iossa et al, in their report entitled “Best Practices on Contract Design in Public-
Private Partnerships,” stated that the output specifications are usually defined by the 
public sector during the pretender stage of the project. It is recommended that the output 
specifications risk be allocated to the public sector to serve as a motivation for the 
experts in the tender committee to spend time and effort to avoid any mistakes that 
might occur in the output specifications and appear later during the design stage. 
However, this might not be sufficient motivation for the public sector officials as, 
simply, the public sector officials may lack the financial and technical capabilities. In 
addition, PPP projects last for a long period of time, and mistakes are more likely to be 
discovered at a later stage, at which point the government employee responsible for 
them may have changed jobs already. Hence, the public sector should appoint 
consultants or an external advisory committee to produce the specifications of the 
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output requirements in order to be held accountable and carry such risks in case of an 
error discovered in a later stage of the project (Iossa et al, 2007). 
 
2 . 6 . 2 . 4   Design, Planning and Construction Risk 
In most of the cases, government interference during the design and the 
construction stage is minimal. The design, planning, and construction risk includes the 
design stage, the planning stage, the construction stage, the commissioning stage, and 
the operation stage. All of the above should be allocated to the private sector to work 
as a motivation to perform its obligations and duties under the contract agreement. The 
private sector should plan for any event that might result in a cost or a time over-run, 
or in mistakes in the design. Moreover, it should plan for any potential risks that would 
result in unavailability or inadequacy of the service provided. In some circumstances, 
the risk sharing mechanism between the public and the private sectors is used, 
especially when dealing with renovation projects, as the government in this case would 
be the party who can evaluate the conditions of the existing assets and predict the 
probability of occurrence of relevant risks (Stemmer, 2008). 
 
2 . 6 . 2 . 5   Demand Risk 
In their paper entitled “Private Concession Contracts for Toll Roads in Spain: 
Analysis and Recommendations,” Baeza and Vassallo state that the demand risk is one 
of the main reasons for renegotiation. Demand risks can be allocated to the private 
sector, the public sector, or shared between the two of them depending on the nature of 
the demand in different PPP projects. For projects in which the users pay for the service, 
the demand risk is best allocated to the private sector, as it is the sector that can best 
quantify such risk. For projects wherein the public sector pays the private sector a 
unitary charge, the demand risk is best allocated to the public sector, as it is the one in 
control of the demand, such as in the case of prisons. Finally, in projects where the 
private sector depends on cash forecasts and cannot predict accurately the expected 
demand, such as infrastructure projects such as a road or a bridge, it is better to reach a 
risk sharing mechanism between the public and the private sectors (Baeza & Vassallo, 
2010). 
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2 . 6 . 2 . 6   Price Risk 
The price risk is the risk that the value of the service or the service charges will 
change from the base charge assumed at the beginning of the project. This can occur 
due to reasons such as an economic crisis, a change in government practices, new 
competition or substitutes entering the market, competitors lowering their prices, new 
preferences of the target market, or simply the service becomes outdated. The Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities, in their report entitled “Long 
Term Contracts between Government Unites and Nongovernment Partners,” states that 
the allocation of such risk varies depending on the nature of the project and whether the 
private sector deals with the users directly or through the government. In general, it is 
expected that the public sector is the best party able to quantify that risk, and it may, in 
an indirect way, change some of the public needs themselves. However, it is also 
recommended to introduce a risk sharing technique to involve the private sector in the 
equation, as it is the best party to assess the different ways to satisfy the public’s needs 
as they arise. In order to mitigate this risk, a precise forecast should be developed to 
predict the demand and the market conditions of a certain service (Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 2004). 
 
2 . 6 . 2 . 7   Financial Risk  
One type of financial risk is the possibility that a project will suffer a lack of 
funds at some period in time due to insufficient debt or equity. Other financial risks are 
a change in the prices of project elements prices, as well as the risk that the bidders 
have lowered their prices due to a competitive market to the extent that the private 
sector will not be able to fulfill its duties under the contract. 
It is recommended to allocate the financial risk to the private sector, as it is the 
best party to deal with financial risks. This is a motivation for the private sector to avoid 
importing many foreign resources, and it serves on the domestic level to mitigate such 
risk as investors will try to use local suppliers. The public sector may also apply tariffs 
to the exchange rates in order to encourage the private sector to go to the local market 
instead. In the case of developing countries where importing cannot be avoided, the 
exchange rate risk should be allocated to the public sector. Moreover, the government 
usually prefers to allocate tax risks and the like to the private sector. However, unlike 
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several other references, Iossa et al maintain that the risks that have to do with changes 
in the price of project parameters, including for example a change in the interest rate, 
are shared between the public and the private sectors, but the public sector carries the 
larger share of the risk. The government can also mitigate the risk of the private sector 
underbidding the project by closely monitoring the bidding process and the market 
conditions at that time. In other words, the government should make sure that the short-
listed bidders are able to fulfill the contract and not merely choose the lowest bidder 
without ensuring that the bid is the actual fair value of the project (Iossa et al, 2007). 
 
2 . 6 . 2 . 8   Investment Risk 
Pantelias, in his PhD dissertation entitled “A Methodological Framework for 
Probabilistic Evaluation of Financial Viability of Transportation Infrastructure Under 
Public Private Partnerships,” defined the investment or sponsor risk as the risk that the 
private sector or its subcontractors fail to fulfill their duties and obligations in the 
contract; moreover, the government is unable to interfere and force the private sector 
to fulfill these obligations. This risk can be a result of a change in ownership in the 
private sector. In order to mitigate this risk, the government should ensure that the 
contract contains provisions to obtain the government consent before any change in the 
ownership of the private sector. The government should ensure that the new owner will 
be able to fulfill the contractual obligations. In this case, it is preferred that this risk be 
allocated to the public sector, as the private sector cannot regulate this type of risk 
(Pantelias, 2009). 
 
2 . 6 . 2 . 9   Residual Value Risk 
The residual value risk includes any damage of the facilities, a technology 
change that will result in the asset being obsolete, or simply the appearance of a 
substitute or competition. It is crucial for the public sector to ensure that the asset will 
be in good shape at the end of the concession period, which is why the public sector 
should put a provision in the contract to ensure that part of the payment to the private 
sector is retained against the condition of the asset at the end of this period. This risk 
29 
 
shall be allocated to the private sector as a motivation to ensure the quality of the asset 
at the end of the concession period (Engel et al, 2009). 
 
2 . 6 . 2 . 10   Macroeconomic Risk  
Checherita and Gifford, in their paper entitled “Risk Sharing in Public-Private 
Partnerships: General Considerations and an Evaluation of the U.S. Practice in Road 
Transportation,” list the different PPP related risks and their preferred allocation. One 
of the risks introduced is the macroeconomic risk. An example of macroeconomic risk 
is the financial crisis of 2008. Macroeconomic risk is a risk that occurs on a wide scale 
and affects the economy globally. It can come in many forms, such as a crisis in the 
exchange rates or a severe financial crisis. Macroeconomic risk is better allocated to an 
insurer, or at least to the public sector, as it cannot be controlled by the private sector. 
Macroeconomic shocks and financial crises affect a concession contract enormously, 
as most of the operator’s obligations and investment are in foreign currency while it 
collects its revenues in local currency (Checherita & Gifford, 2007). 
 
2 . 6 . 2 . 11   Operation Risk  
Operation risk is the risk of failing to deliver the service as per the contract due 
to a fault in a certain element in the operation process, or simply due to cost over-runs. 
The public sector prefers to allocate this risk to the private sector, as the level of 
intervention of the government is preferred to be kept minimal at this stage. In order to 
mitigate this risk, the government should carefully draft clear service output 
requirements. The private sector should forecast future plans for the service, and predict 
the change in the different operation requirements, if any. Those future plans should be 
mentioned in the contract to give the private sector flexibility to adjust the operation 
process in order to upgrade the existing process to meet those new requirements (Garg, 
2012). 
However, Iossa and Martimort, in their paper entitled “Risk Allocation and the 
Costs and Benefits of Public-Private Partnerships,” stated that when the operation risk 
is very high, it better not to use the PPP option and combine the design with the 
execution of the service. In other words, in the case of a complex project, the 
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government would not be able to anticipate the project costs and operation 
contingencies in advance; hence, transferring the operation risk to the private sector is 
not the optimum solution (Iossa & Martimort, 2012). 
 
2 . 6 . 2 . 12   Network Risk  
PPP projects are usually large projects that deal with many parties to deliver the 
service. The private sector does not only deal with the public sector or the financiers, 
but also with many other parties, building a network. This network can include more 
than one PPP project, as well as some other parties that support the PPP projects. The 
network risk is the risk that any part of this network may not function properly, thus 
affecting the service delivery. For example, in the case of a water treatment plant, the 
private sector would collaborate with a water company to provide water for the 
treatment process. The failure of this water company to deliver water to the treatment 
plant will affect the service and, as a result, is a network risk. This risk should be 
allocated to the public sector, as the public sector is the only party that can coordinate 
with all the parties in the network. In order to mitigate this risk, during the pretender 
stage, the public sector should study carefully the relationships and dependencies 
between the different parties of the network; moreover, the government should make 
sure that the needs of the new project will be met (Hegazy & Wassef, 2001). 
Jenkin, in his PhD dissertation entitled “Multiple-Case Examinations of 
Complex Decisions to Form Networked Public-Private Partnerships,” was able to 
determine the factors affecting the decisions of PPP officials. Those factors should help 
in eliminating the network risk. The factors included economic and political factors that 
should be studied carefully to suit both the public and the private sectors. Moreover, 
the level of know-how required by the specifications of the service delivered by the 
PPP is another factor. Low turnover rates, risks allocation, and parties’ reputations 
should also be considered in order to mitigate the network risk (Jenkins, 2012). 
 
2 . 6 . 2 . 13   Interface Risk  
The network risk deals with the broader network that the PPP project is part of, 
but the interface risk is about the inner network within the PPP project itself. The 
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interface risk is the risk that the process of delivering the service will in some way 
prevent the core service from being delivered to the users. An example is the 
sterilization process in a hospital where the time needed to accomplish this process will 
affect the delivery of the service to the hospital users. Such risk should be allocated to 
the private sector in order to ensure that the private sector will coordinate between the 
different players and make sure that the service is being delivered as per the contract 
(Archer & Cameron, 2003). 
 
2 . 6 . 2 . 14   Force Majeure Risk  
Force majeure risk is any event that would prevent the private sector from 
fulfilling its obligations in the contract, provided that this event is out of control of both 
the private and the public sectors. The public sector would prefer that this risk be 
allocated to the private sector. The private sector is asked to provide insurance for such 
risk as a way to mitigate it; however, if the cost of such insurance is very high or 
unreasonable, the risk is allocated to the public sector instead (Kashani, 2012). 
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CHAPTER 3 : CURRENT PRACTICE IN CONTRACT 
RENEGOTIATION 
3 . 1   Current Practice 
3 . 1 . 1   PPP Life Cycle 
The lifecycle of PPP projects consists of seven phases. The PPP lifecycle starts 
with identification of the project of interest. Then, the client or the government should 
prepare a feasibility study, followed by the pre-qualification stage, and finally bidding 
the project. Then, both the client and the service provider start the negotiation stage, 
which leads to contract signing, after which the contract management stage continues 
until the end of the project lifecycle. The PPP project lifecycle is shown in Figure 3, 
which is prepared by the Public Private Partnership Central Unit in Egypt (Public 
Private Partnership Central Unit, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 3: PPP Project Life Cycle (Public Private Partnership Central 
Unit, 2009) 
 
Phase I: Project Initiation & 
Screening
Phase II: Business Case
Phase III: Risk Assessment, 
VFM Analysis & PSC
Phase IV: Tendering & 
Procurement
Phase V: Bid Selection
Phase VI: Contract Signing & 
Financial Closure
Phase VII: Post-Award 
Performance Monitoring
33 
 
Phase one of the PPP project lifecycle is the project initiation and screening, 
which answers the question of whether to proceed with the PPP delivery method or not. 
Phase two provides a detailed business case. This includes defining the exact scope and 
output specifications of the PPP project. It also includes a detailed technical, financial, 
economic, legal, and environmental feasibility studies. Phase three is concerned with 
the PPP affordability and risk assessment, which is done through developing a value 
for money (VFM) analysis and the Public Sector Comparator (PSC). In his paper 
entitled “Public Sector Comparator for Highway PPP Projects,” Kerali defines the 
Public Sector Comparator (PSC) as a detailed study of calculating the PPP lifecycle 
cost in case the public sector decides to pursue conventional procurement methods, 
providing that it will deliver the same output specifications and quality of the private 
sector. The Public Sector Comparator (PSC) should account for the costs incurred by 
the private sector, such as the opportunity cost of public assets in the project; moreover, 
it should be adjusted for the interest rate, taking into consideration the inflation and any 
subsidies as well (Kerali, 2009). 
If the PSC proves that the PPP option is more efficient, the project moves to 
phase four. Phase four is the tendering and procurement of the PPP project. This phase 
starts with issuing the Expression of Interest (EOI), followed by issuing the Information 
Memorandum and the pre-qualification documents. After receiving the forms from 
interested bidders, the bidding documents are prepared and sent to bidders in order to 
receive their final proposal. Another difference between PPP and conventional 
procurement methods is the bidder company. PPP requires the formation of a new entity 
called the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), which usually consists of a consortium of 
several companies (generally financial, construction, and operation companies). The 
SPV is formed for the purpose of conducting a single PPP project only. Moreover, in 
some rare cases, the public sector can be part of the consortium in exchange for shares. 
Phase five is the most important of all phases: the bidder selection. There are 
many methods for the bidder selection phase; however, the most common technique is 
the two-envelope method. In this method, the bidders submit two sealed envelopes: a 
technical bid and a financial bid. The technical bid is to be opened at the beginning to 
exclude unqualified bidders, followed by the financial bids of the qualified bidders 
only. After comparing the financial models submitted by the different bidders to the 
Public Sector Comparator (PSC), the winning bidder is selected and notified.  
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Phase six is the contract signature and financial closure, which includes the 
implementation of Conditions Precedent. Phase seven is the post-award, monitoring 
which continues till the end of the project lifecycle. During the execution of the PPP 
project, the concessionaire usually does not receive any operation payments until the 
construction phase is completed and the facility is ready to be operated.  The payment 
can be in a form of service charges paid by the government, fees paid by the users of 
the service, or a combination of both. In general, the concessionaire usually 
subcontracts a construction company, to which it passes the construction and output 
risks. In some cases, the concessionaire chooses to allocate to the construction 
contractor more tightened conditions, such as shortening the concession period or 
increasing the penalties. According to Kriegler, the form of agreement between the 
concessionaire and the construction contractor is usually a Design Build Agreement, 
Figure 4 (Kriegler, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 4: PPP Agreement Structure (Kriegler, 2006) 
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sector consortium and the government. It also shows the different components of the 
consortium, as it includes fund sources such as debt sources, usually represented in the 
bank, and equity sources, represented in the different investors. In addition, the 
consortium should include a design and construction contractor. The type of contract in 
this case is usually a design and build contract, as stated above. The consortium should 
also include the operator, which usually starts acting before the end of the construction 
phase and extends beyond the concession period and all the way up to the handover of 
the facility back to the government (Department of Treasury and Finance, 2001).  
 
3 . 1 . 2   The PPP Financial Model 
The financial bid of the PPP project is different from conventional projects, as 
it includes detailed calculations comprising all costs and revenues associated with the 
PPP project. The financial model is usually done on a spreadsheet, such as Microsoft 
Excel. According to the Public Private Partnership Handbook issued by the Asian 
Development Bank, the private sector financial model's main purpose is to calculate all 
the direct and indirect costs, contingencies, and profits in order to come up with the 
service fees. The model includes assumptions, inputs, and outputs. Assumptions 
include inflation rates, taxes, etc.; moreover, the modeler should input the capital 
expenditure (Capex), the operating expense (Opex), equity and debt service data, 
revenues based on forecasted demands or production rates, etc. The model also includes 
calculations of the different financial statements of the SPV, including income 
statement, cash-flow statement, profit and loss account, and the balance sheet. The 
model also provides a group of financial indicators such as the Internal Rate of Return 
(IRR), Return on Equity (ROE), Annual Debt Service Coverage Ratio (ADSCR), and 
Loan Life Debt Service Cover Ratio (LLCR) (Public Private Partnership Handbook, 
2008). 
According to Turhani and Turhani in their paper entitled “Financial Model of a 
PPP Project,” the importance of the bidders’ financial models is that they are compared 
to shadow bid models prepared by the public sector to ensure the viability of the bids. 
Further, the lenders usually require the private sector to submit the financial model in 
order to ensure that the private sector will be able to meet the loan payment deadlines. 
Moreover, the financial model is a very handy tool during the lifecycle of the project, 
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as it is the only way to adjust the service fees to reflect changes in the contract, variation 
orders, or refinance gains, if it is included in the contract conditions. It also can be used 
while monitoring the project budget and to provide financial statements along the 
lifecycle of the project (Turhani & Turhani, 2012).  
 
3 . 2   Contract Renegotiation 
3 . 2 . 1   Triggers of Renegotiation 
Guasch and Straub, in their paper entitled “Renegotiation of Infrastructure 
Concessions: An Overview,” stated that due to the length of PPP projects, renegotiation 
is inevitable during the concession period; therefore, the renegotiation process should 
be defined clearly and accounted for before awarding the PPP contract. Moreover, 
renegotiation triggers should be defined carefully and drafted in the contract in order to 
avoid unnecessary costs of unjustified renegotiation claims. The government can 
misuse its power; on the other hand, the private sector may ask to renegotiate the 
contract and obtain a better deal that may not be in favor of the users and may allow 
monopoly behavior by the private sector. Hence, good contract design and regulatory 
framework is necessary to regulate the incidence of renegotiating any concession 
contract (Guasch & Straub, 2006). 
Guasch and Straub published another article, entitled “Corruption and 
Concession Renegotiations: Evidence from the Water and Transport Sectors in Latin 
America,” in 2009. In their paper, Guasch and Straub discuss more than 300 PPP 
contracts in Latin America, and are able to prove that the level of corruption in the 
countries had a high impact on the number of contracts renegotiated. They summarized 
the different factors that increase or decrease the probability of renegotiation. The 
factors increasing the probability of renegotiation are corruption, many investment 
obligations, very competitive environment, allocating most risks to the private sector, 
lack of regulation enforcement, financial crisis, indulgent award requirements, and 
awarding the project close to election dates. The factors decreasing the probability of 
renegotiation are strong enforcement of the contract terms, gaining experience by 
increasing the number of PPP projects in a country, and minimizing the income 
guarantees (Guasch & Straub, 2009).  
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Moreover, Garg, in his PhD dissertation entitled “Working the PPP: 
Coordination of Public-Private Partnerships,” also proves that the degree of experience 
of the different parties’ representatives greatly affects the level of coordination among 
the different parties. This hugely influences the contract renegotiation possibilities, as 
well. While designing the contract, the contract terms should try as much as possible to 
account for any potential changes in the project. This ensures the flexibility of the 
contract and makes it easier to renegotiate the contract in a later stage when the change 
occurs. In cases where changes cannot be determined, a concept similar to cost plus 
contracts can be used, or a provision may be added in the contract against such change, 
provided that such cost plus value shall be reviewed by a committee of experts to ensure 
that the private sector will not take advantage of this cost plus method and that the costs 
are at the market prices (Garg, 2012). 
In their paper entitled “Multidimensionality and Renegotiation: Evidence from 
Transport-Sector Public-Private-Partnership Transactions in Latin America,” Estache 
et al state that the likelihood of renegotiation depends on many variables that exist along 
the lifecycle of PPPs, as early as the bidding stage. Renegotiation can be a result of 
internal project factors, such as unforeseen risks, or external factors, such as changes in 
the government policy. Renegotiation usually reflects an incomplete contract (Estache 
et al, 2009).  
According to De Brux in his paper entitled “The Dark and Bright Sides of 
Renegotiation: An Application to Transport,” the incompleteness of PPP contracts costs 
the public sector the burden of resorting to renegotiation. The complexity of 
renegotiation is proportional to the size and complexity of the project and the length of 
the concession period, as well. The more complex, bigger, and longer the project is, the 
highest the probability of going through contract renegotiation (De Brux, 2010).  
In their paper entitled “Balancing Contractual and Relational Approaches for 
PPP Success and Sustainability,” Kumaraswamy, Anvuur, and Rahman study inflexible 
contracts as one of the triggers of the PPP contract renegotiation. They propose a system 
that combines both the traditional contracting protocols and what is called relational 
contracting (RC), which is more flexible in terms of dealing with unforeseen conditions 
and the risk that arises suddenly during the execution of the project  (Kumaraswamy et 
al, 2005).  
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Silva, in his paper entitled “Toll Roads: Recent Trends in Private Participation,” 
conducted a literature review to explain some lessons learned from some cases of failure 
in Latin America. One of the cases was a toll road program that failed for several 
reasons; the main among them is that the contract was not flexible enough to mitigate 
all the construction and the operation risks. In other words, the contract gave more care 
to the construction risks than the operation risks (Silva, 2000). 
According to Garvin in his paper entitled “Governance of PPP Projects through 
Contract Provisions,” one of the most important factors in the renegotiation process is 
the mutual trust between the different parties, which leads eventually to sustainability. 
The key aspect of this approach is sharing benefits and risks among the different parties 
of the PPP through the contract agreement; however, some problems and unforeseen 
risks may occur during the construction and the operation that have not been included 
within the contract clauses. Garvin has studied different incentives mechanisms through 
some contract clauses in order to make those clauses flexible to absorb any risks arising 
after the commencement of the project and minimize the need for renegotiation (Garvin, 
2009).  
Dong, in his PhD dissertation entitled “Essays in Advanced Risk Management 
and Quantitative Strategies in Infrastructure Finance,” used the concept of contract 
flexibility, as well. In his dissertation, he incorporated the critical success factors 
(CSFs) of PPP projects into a tool to help achieve economic efficiency of PPP projects 
by using the concept of contract flexibility (Dong, 2010). Finally, clear and flexible 
contract provisions, choosing a suitable payment mechanism, and providing 
transparency along the project execution are good practices to encourage investors to 
pursue the PPP path and minimize the probability of renegotiation. 
According to the European Investment Bank (EIB), renegotiations that lead to 
major changes in PPP contracts are banned by the European Union Laws; in addition, 
it recommends that contracts are drafted in a way that minimizes the need for larger 
renegotiation operations. Moreover, the EIB proposes using a “facilitator” to moderate 
the renegotiation process in a fair and neutral way in order to guarantee its efficiency. 
The bank states that the renegotiation process has many benefits for regaining the 
equilibrium of the contract; however, most recorded renegotiation requests aim only for 
unjustified gains, which should be forbidden (European Investment Bank, 2011).  
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Roach also recommends, in his PhD dissertation entitled “Law and Politics in 
Public Private Partnerships: Transparency, Conflict of Interest, and Renegotiation in 
Concession Arrangements,” establishing an “independent auditor” within the public 
sector to be responsible for all the PPP projects in the state or government. Roach 
suggests that the independent auditor be formed by five members who have knowledge 
and experience in the PPP field. The advantage of such an institution is to avoid 
conflicts between the different governmental institutions involved in the PPP process 
that may lead to the failure of PPP projects. Roach states that the auditor will prevent 
any initiations of conflicts of interest and will help in the process of renegotiation in 
general (Roach , 2011). 
Other than the above recommendations, the contract designer of a PPP project 
should apply some adjustments in order to ensure a well-defined path for the 
renegotiation process to avoid unfavorable solutions, such as termination. Dewatripont 
and Legros, in their paper entitled “Public-Private Partnerships: Contract Design and 
Risk Transfer,” recommend that PPP contracts have a clear method of output indicators. 
They also suggest a clear procedure to revise the different cost items and evaluate the 
investments and assets of the project. Moreover, PPP contracts should include a clear 
method of conflict resolution and early termination (Dewatripont & Legros, 2009). 
Chan and Yu, in their paper entitled “Contract Strategy for Design Management 
in the Design and Build System,” discussed the design and build projects with large 
scales similar to PPP projects. Although the public sector procures the private sector to 
do the design and construction work, the coordination between the designer and the 
contractor is still a concern for the public sector. The paper focuses on the different 
responsibilities in the design phase and how the design is coordinated between the 
design consultant and the contractor. In addition, the researchers performed a survey to 
determine the obligations of each party in the design stage and the ability of existing 
contract terms to reflect these obligations. Chan and Yu introduce a set of rules to be 
considered when drafting the contracts in order to avoid renegotiation (Chan & Yu, 
2005). 
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3 . 2 . 2   Frequency of Renegotiation 
Renegotiation arises from a major change that is usually included within the 
terms and conditions of the concession contract, such as a change in law, a change in 
payment, a change in the concession period, or a change in technical standards. Changes 
in tariffs due to inflation or periodic changes as per the contract are not considered to 
be renegotiations.  
In their paper entitled “Concessions of Infrastructure in Latin America: 
Government-Led Renegotiation,” Guasch, Laffont and Straub present statistics 
belonging from Latin America that renegotiation occurs in 74 percent of water and 
sanitation concession contracts versus 55 percent in transportation concession 
contracts; moreover, they are able to calculate an average of the time of renegotiation 
from the contract award date, which was estimated to be 1.6 years in case of water and 
sanitary projects versus 3.1 years in case of transportations projects. The above results 
show a high frequency of renegotiation in concessions contracts, which raise the 
question of the validity of the concession model and its efficiency. If bidders become 
aware of their ability to easily renegotiate the concession, they would be inclined to 
gain the concession at any price, then renegotiate the terms to obtain a better deal that 
erases the benefits of a concession contract. Hence, Guasch et al recommend fixing a 
renegotiation fee to be paid by the private sector in order to avoid unnecessary 
renegotiation claims; however, such fees shall be refunded to the private sector in case 
the renegotiation was in favor of the private sector (Guasch et al, 2007). 
Moreover, contract renegotiation is more likely to occur in contracts awarded 
through competitive bidding, while it is less likely to occur in bilateral negotiation 
concession contracts, as bidders may be forced to lower their prices to unrealistic 
margins to stay in competition. According to Marques and Berg in their paper entitled 
“Revisiting the Strengths and Limitations of Regulatory Contracts in Infrastructure 
Industries,” contracts which follow a price cap regime are subjected to renegotiation 
more than contracts following the rate of return regime. In 60 percent of the cases, the 
private sector is the initiator of the renegotiation. Table 2 explains the percentages of 
renegotiated contracts with the combined effect of the type of regulation and the 
initiator of the renegotiation. In case of the Price Cap Regime, the operator feels at risk; 
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hence, this justifies the 83 percent of operators initiating the renegotiation process 
(Marques & Berg, 2010). 
Table 2: Percentage of Renegotiated Contracts (Marques & Berg, 2010) 
Initiator of 
Renegotiation 
Both Government 
and Operator 
Government Operator 
Price Cap 11% 6% 83% 
Rate of Return 39% 34% 26% 
Hybrid Regime 30% 26% 44% 
 
3 . 2 . 3   PPP Contract Renegotiation and the Re-equilibrium Model  
Due to the long term nature of PPP projects, unforeseen conditions have a very 
high probability of occurrence; hence, PPP contracts usually contain provisions for 
contract renegotiation in order to enhance transparency and flexibility in the contract. 
The private sector should have a very strong financial monitor and control policy in 
order to identify the events that may lead to unbalancing the contract equilibrium. 
The agreed upon financial model of a PPP project is used as a basis to create a 
re-equilibrium model. The financial model provides a way for the different parties in 
the PPP project to have common ground when forced to make some modifications to 
the service fees. The importance of the re-equilibrium model comes from its 
transparency, which makes it clear for all parties which parts have changed, as well as 
the effect of such parts on the rest of the model.  
The private sector, the public sector, or both may call for contract renegotiation 
upon realizing a change in the financial model equilibrium. In PPP contracts, the party 
responsible for preparing the re-equilibrium sheet whenever a risk materializes and 
defining responsibilities of events is called the Independent Financial Expert, which is 
a third party. Whenever a risk arises, the Independent Financial Expert calculates the 
impact of such risk on the different elements of the base financial model. The change 
can be in the assumptions or the inputs of the base financial model components. Then, 
the Independent Financial Expert develops the re-equilibrium sheet, which usually has 
a number of options to keep the financial model balanced and ensure that the private 
sector is getting the contractual internal rate of return (IRR). The common three 
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scenarios that the re-equilibrium sheet has are: increasing the service charges, 
increasing the concession period, paying a lump sum amount to the private sector, or a 
combination of any of the above in order to maintain the original IRR constant. 
 
3 . 2 . 4   Results of Renegotiation 
The output of the renegotiation process is usually a change to the financial 
model, which reflects a number of possibilities, such as a change to the service charge 
rate, a change to one or more of the different cost items, a change to the concession 
period, etc. 
Ho, in his paper entitled “Model for Financial Renegotiation in Public Private 
Partnership Projects and Its Policy Implications: Game Theoretic View,” develops a 
dynamic game model, which means that the decision makers in the model make their 
decisions in sequence; in other words, the government knows the decision of the private 
sector before making their new decision, and vice versa. A game theory model is a term 
describing “the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between 
intelligent rational decision-makers” (Myerson, 1991). The aim of Ho’s model is to 
help the public sector in developing new policies and regulations to avoid the 
opportunistic behavior of the private sector bidders by comparing the political cost of 
re-tendering the project versus the political cost of renegotiation (Ho, 2006). 
When discussing the results of the renegotiation process, the question shall 
always be whether to accept or reject the renegotiation claim. Ho, in his paper entitled 
“Government Policy on PPP Financial Issues: Bid Compensation and Financial 
Renegotiation,” has developed a model to answer this question. Ho recommends 
avoiding renegotiation as much as possible, as it usually favors the private sector and 
may harm the competitive nature of the bidding process. Ho develops a game-
theoretical model for the financial renegotiation process (Ho, 2009).  
In the below table, Guasch, Laffont, and Straub demonstrate the percentage of 
negotiated contracts with a certain renegotiation outcome. As shown in Table 3, 69 
percent of the renegotiated contracts in the selected sample agreed to delay the targets 
of the investment obligations of the private sector (Guasch et al, 2007). 
43 
 
                  Table 3: Renegotiation Outcomes (Guasch L., 2004) 
Renegotiation Outcome 
% 
Renegotiated 
Contracts 
Delays on investment obligations targets 69% 
Acceleration of investment obligations 18% 
  
Tariff Increases 62% 
Tariff Decreases 19% 
  
Increase in the number of cost component which increase tariff 59% 
Extension in the Concession Period 38% 
  
Increase Annual fees paid by the Operator 17% 
Decrease Annual fees paid by the Operator 31% 
 
Xu et al developed a pricing model to calculate the price of PPP contracts both 
before and after renegotiation in their paper entitled, “Developing a Concession Pricing 
Model for PPP Highway Projects.” They generated a simplified equation to calculate 
the concession price present value based on the in and out cash flows, considering the 
construction and operation costs, the loan repayment, taxes, and revenues. Equation 1 
Equation 1: PPP Pricing Equation (Xu et al, 2012) 
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shows the steps of calculating the concession price by considering the financial 
elements and price parameters of PPP. Xu et al developed a price adjustment 
mechanism in order to account for unforeseen risks and fluctuation in inflation and 
interest rates in the original pricing equation. Equation 2 shows the different PPP risks 
and their effect on the pricing equation (Xu et al, 2012).  
 
3 . 3   Tools to Facilitate the Renegotiation Process 
3 . 3 . 1   Decision Support Systems (DSS) 
Decision Support Systems (DSS) are tools to choose from a set of alternatives. 
DSS can be very helpful in assisting the choice among the different re-equilibrium 
scenarios of the PPP financial model. Such tools can facilitate the PPP contract 
renegotiation process. In their paper entitled “Developing a Theory of Construction 
Problem Solving,” Li and Love conclude that Decision Support Systems can be 
developed to deal with complex decisions (Li & Love, 1998). 
In their paper entitled “Management Information Systems,” Sousa and Oz state 
that Decision Support Systems (DSS) usually contain three modules: “Data 
Management Module,” “Model Management Module,” and “Dialog Module;” 
moreover, in some cases, it also contains “Sensitivity Analysis Module.” The Data 
Management Module is where the database is; in other words, it contains all the relevant 
data that will be used in the decision making process. The Model Management Module 
can be a fixed or dynamic module, in which the output can depend on fixed data, or it 
can change with the change of data. Another name of the Dialog Module is the user 
interface, where this is the part of the model with which the user will be dealing. The 
Equation 2: The Effect of PPP Risks on the Pricing Equation (Xu et al, 2012) 
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Sensitivity Analysis module is the module measuring the effect of certain inputs on the 
outputs of the model (Sousa & Oz, 2014). Decision Support Systems (DSS) are systems 
developed to imitate experts; they can be used in many applications, such as making 
choices, consulting, teaching, training, diagnosing, repairing, predicting, and 
monitoring and control (Turban & Watson, 1994). 
In this research, the alternatives to be chosen from are the outputs of the 
renegotiation process, which are increasing the service charges, increasing the 
concession period, or paying a lump sum amount to the private sector. The limitation 
of the decision is to maintain the contractual internal rate of return (IRR) constant. The 
factors affecting such a decision are different and vary according to whether they are 
associated with the private sector or the public sector. As stated in the problem 
statement section, the public and the private sectors usually have different interests 
when it comes to renegotiation. The private sector is seeking profits, while the public 
sector is seeking public demands. Hence, DSS will serve in making sure that the 
interests of both parties are considered in the decision making process. 
 
3 . 3 . 2   Applications of DSS in PPP 
Ghavamifar, in his PhD dissertation entitled “A Decision Support System for 
Project Delivery Method Selection in the Transit Industry,” developed a Decision 
Support System that helped the public sector in the selection process of a suitable 
delivery method for the transit projects. Ghavamifar included many parameters in his 
model, such as financial issues, including the value for money (VFM) aspect and the 
public sector comparator (PSC) in case of PPP delivery method. By choosing the most 
suitable delivery method, projects were more likely to attain their goals in efficient 
ways. One of the main advantages of Ghavamifar’s model is that it was a tool which 
provides a fair comparison between PPP and conventional delivery methods despite the 
many differences between them (Ghavamifar, 2009). 
Gross, in her PhD dissertation entitled “Aligning Public-Private Partnership 
Contracts with Public Objectives for Transportation Infrastructure,” developed 
Decision Support Systems for determining the key features of PPP contracts, such as 
the length of the concession period, the payment mechanism, and the risk mitigation 
46 
 
techniques. Gross studied a database of eighteen PPP projects in the United States and 
other countries by using a new method called “Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(QCA)” in order to assess qualitative data quantitatively. The criteria of selection 
included reaching a specific unit rate, minimizing government subsidies, and increasing 
revenues (Gross, 2010). 
Kassab, in his PhD dissertation entitled “Integrated Decision Support System 
for Infrastructure Privatization under Uncertainty Using Conflict Resolution,” 
developed a Decision Support System to choose a suitable PPP type for an 
infrastructure project. PPPs have many types that can suit the different parties’ interests. 
This model helps in reducing conflict by being able to choose a module that fits all 
parties, minimizing the probability of conflict. It also minimizes cost and time wasted 
in those conflicts. Moreover, Kassab’s model is adjusted to suit environments with high 
levels of uncertainty (Kassab, 2006).  
Finally, Jin, in his paper entitled “Neurofuzzy Decision Support System for 
Efficient Risk Allocation in Public-Private Partnership Infrastructure Projects,” 
developed a Decision Support System with the aid of artificial intelligence tools to 
predict the optimum allocation of risks in infrastructure PPP projects. The model proved 
to give precise and effective results (Jin, 2010).  
  
3 . 4   Originality of Research 
This research develops a framework in order to support and facilitate the PPP 
contract renegotiation process. As shown in previous research, the contract 
renegotiation process is very frequent in the case of PPP projects. The tool developed 
consists of a Decision Support System in order to enable the model developed to deal 
with choosing a renegotiation re-equilibrium scenario suitable for both the public and 
the private sectors. This has never been attempted in previous research. The Decision 
Support System will not only provide a way to choose among the different re-
equilibrium scenarios, but it will also provide a tool to calculate the different scenarios. 
The Decision Support System is a user-friendly tool which helps non-expert users 
through the decision making process. The model shall also provide the user with 
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strategic decision making reports and sensitivity analysis. This model is considered 
interdisciplinary research, as it combines civil engineering and management sciences.    
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CHAPTER 4 : RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4 . 1   Framework Development 
The purpose of this research is to facilitate the PPP renegotiation process, 
starting from specifying the events leading to renegotiation, moving to formulating the 
re-equilibrium scenarios, and finally choosing the optimum scenario to satisfy all 
parties. Stakeholders have different interests and concerns in the renegotiation process; 
hence, the proposed model will work on finding common ground between all parties in 
order to reach an optimum renegotiation outcome. This will ensure a fair approach and 
enhance mutual trust between the stakeholders, which will benefit the project’s overall 
progress. 
The following framework is to be of great benefit to decision makers in the 
public and the private sectors, yet the objective of the proposed framework is not to be 
a substitute for decision makers. During renegotiation, the only way to benefit the 
project is to make sure that all parties are compensated justly so that they can fulfill 
their obligations under the contract agreement; in other words, if the investors are not 
getting a sufficient rate of return, the project will not function properly, which will 
eventually harm the interests of the client.  
In order to achieve the thesis objective, a framework is developed in order to 
facilitate the PPP contract renegotiation process. The framework consists of eight 
modules: a User-Interface Module, a Risk Allocation Module, a PPP Valuation Module, 
a Financial Model Re-equilibrium Module, a Scenarios Development Module, a 
Scenarios Selection Module, a Reports Module and a Sensitivity Analysis Module, 
Figure 5. The user-interface module interacts with all the other seven modules as it 
provides inputs and receives outputs from all of them. The risk allocation module 
presents the risk matrix of the project and the risks allocated to the private sector, the 
public sector, or shared between them. It also shows the impact of the risks on the 
different cost parameters. The PPP valuation module defines the present value of the 
concession, while the financial model re-equilibrium module defines the adjusted 
present value due to an event or a group of events resulting in the destruction of the 
balance of the financial model equilibrium. Then, the scenarios development module 
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calculates the different scenarios to return to the contract equilibrium. The  scenarios 
selection module helps to provide a clear method of selection among the different 
scenarios. Finally, the reports module and the sensitivity analysis module provide the 
decision maker with a user friendly version of the results and analysis in order to help 
him in the decision making process. 
 
4 . 2   Prototype DSS Model 
A prototype Decision Support System model is developed to reflect the 
proposed framework. The model is constructed by using a number of computer-aided 
programs including Microsoft Excel 2013, Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) 
programming language, and the Precision Tree 5.5 for Excel add-in. Moreover, the 
Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) programming language helped in making the 
user-interface module simpler, more user-friendly, and more adaptive to the user’s 
requirements. This model is considered to be a multi-user system in which both the 
public sector and the private sector interact with the user-interface consecutively. 
User-Interface Module
Risk Allocation Module
PPP Valuation Module
Financial Model Re-equilibrium Module
Scenario Development Module
Scenario Selection Module
Reports Module
Sensitivity Analysis Module
Figure 5: Proposed Framework Modules 
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Moreover, the Precision Tree 5.5 for Excel add-in tool provided a more vivid 
presentation of the process of selecting the best scenarios for the public sector, the 
private sector, and both of them. It also provided a number of reports and the 
sensitivities of the different inputs. 
As stated in the previous section, the framework has eight modules: a user-
interface module, a risk allocation module, a PPP valuation module, a financial model 
re-equilibrium module, a scenarios development module, a scenarios selection module, 
a reports module and a sensitivity analysis module. Each of the above modules has a 
number of sub-modules, as shown in Figure 6. The user-interface module has the  
 
Project General Information 
Risk Matrix 
Risk Allocation Information 
Risk Impact 
Initial Payment Information 
Updated Payment Information 
Scenario Selection Criteria 
Criteria Importance 
Criteria Ranking 
User-Interface Module 
Risk Allocation Tables 
Risk Allocation Module 
Initial Payment Distribution 
PPP Value Calculations 
PPP Valuation Module 
Updated Payment Distribution 
PPP Updated Value Calculations 
FM Re-equilibrium Module 
Re-equilibrium Scenarios Calculations 
Scenarios Development Module 
Scenario Selection Criteria 
Criteria Weights Calculations 
Weighted Sum Model 
Best Scenario Calculations 
Private Sector Decision Tree and EMV 
Public Sector Decision Tree and EMV 
Combined Decision Tree and EMV 
Scenarios Selection Module 
Risk Allocation Charts 
PPP Initial Value 
PPP Updated Value 
Re-equilibrium Scenarios 
Private Sector Best Scenario 
Public Sector Best Scenario 
Combined Best Scenario 
Probability Chart Report 
Cumulative Chart Report 
Statistical Summary Report 
Decision Table Report 
Optimal Tree Report 
Policy Suggestion Report 
Reports Module 
Selection Criteria Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity Analysis Module 
Figure 6: The Framework Sub-modules 
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 project general information, risk matrix, risk allocation information, risk impact, initial 
payment information, updated payment information, scenario selection criteria, criteria 
importance, and criteria ranking. In addition, the risk allocation module has the risk 
allocation tables. Moreover, the PPP valuation module has the initial payment 
distribution and the PPP value calculations. The scenarios development module has the 
re-equilibrium scenarios calculations, while the scenarios selection module has the 
scenario selection criteria, the criteria weights calculations, the weighted sum model, 
the best scenario calculations, the private sector decision tree, and the expected 
monetary value (EMV), the public sector decision tree and the expected monetary 
value, as well as the combined decision tree and the expected monetary value. Finally, 
the reports module has the risk allocation charts, the PPP initial value, the PPP updated 
value, the re-equilibrium scenarios, the private sector best scenario, public sector best 
scenario, the combined best scenario, the probability chart report, the cumulative chart 
report, the statistical summary report, the decision table report, the optimal tree report, 
and the policy suggestion report, and the sensitivity analysis module has the selection 
criteria sensitivity analysis. 
 
4 . 2 . 1   The User-Interface Module 
The user-interface module networks with all the other modules; the relationship 
between the user-interface module and the other modules is shown in Figure 7. This 
module's function is to provide inputs to the risk allocation module, the PPP valuation 
module, the financial model re-equilibrium module, the scenarios development module, 
and the scenarios selection module based on an interactive dialogue among those 
different modules and the user-interface module. Then, it receives the results and 
analysis from the reports module and the sensitivity analysis module. There exists a 
continuous interaction between this module and the other modules along the 
framework. The input process is dynamic, as it depends on sending and receiving 
information along the modules of the prototype model. A set of inputs is entered, and, 
based on the obtained results from a specific module, the following set of inputs become 
ready to be entered.  
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The first set of inputs includes the project name, the PPP contract type, the 
payment mechanism, the payment amount, and the payment intervals. It also contains 
some information with regard to the risk allocation module about the risks profile of 
the project, including all possible risks, their allocations, and their expected impacts on 
the project valuation process. The framework provides both options of having a 
standardized risk sheet and an inputted one. The risk sheet contains the PPP risks, and 
their preferred allocations and expected impacts on the valuation process.  
Then, the user is asked to enter the second set of inputs: some information 
regarding the PPP valuation module, such as the initial payment distribution of the 
project, like the capital expenditure distribution along the lifecycle of the project, and 
other costs and revenues as well. The third set of inputs are for the financial model re-
equilibrium module, such as the main reasons for the re-equilibrium of the contract and 
the corresponding risks and their allocation. It also includes the updated payment 
distributions. 
The above inputs are used in the scenarios development module in order to 
obtain the three common re-equilibrium scenarios: increasing the service charges, 
User-
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PPP Valuation 
Module
Financial 
Model Re-
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Module
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Development 
Module
Scenario 
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Figure 7: Modules Interrelation 
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increasing the concession period, or paying a lump sum amount to the private sector. 
Then, the user-interface module presents those three scenarios in order to choose a 
combination for a fourth scenario (i.e., the fourth scenario shall be an increase in the 
concession period and a payment of a lump sum amount to the private sector). The 
scenarios development module then uses those inputs to provide the final four 
scenarios, moving to the scenarios selection module to pick the best scenario that would 
maximize the satisfaction of both parties.  
This comes by another set of inputs representing the criteria of scenarios 
selection, their weights, and importance with respect to the four scenarios, and the 
ranking of the sub-criteria, based upon which the public sector and the private sector 
choose their best scenarios. Finally, the results are analyzed and reported via the reports 
module and the sensitivity analysis module back to the user-interface module. 
 
4 . 2 . 2   The Risk Allocation Module 
The risk allocation process is a very important process in construction projects, 
and it is even more important when dealing with long-term PPP projects. The 
significance of risk allocation is clear during the renegotiation process. As stated in the 
literature, the government shall only compensate the private sector for the portions of 
the risks that are allocated to the public sector; hence, a clear definition of risk allocation 
should exist in the PPP contract and be included in this proposed framework. 
Figure 8 shows the relationship between the risk allocation module and the other 
related modules. As shown in the figure, the inputs of the risk allocation module come 
from the user-interface module, while the outputs of the risk allocation module are 
heading for the PPP valuation module, the financial model re-equilibrium module, and 
the reports module.  
In the proposed framework, there are two options for obtaining the risk 
allocation percentages of the public sector and the private sector. The first option is the 
user-interface module via inputting the actual values of the risks allocation stated in the 
PPP contract, which is the ideal choice. 
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On the other hand, the risk allocation percentages can be obtained from a 
redefined risk allocation matrix, which is based on a survey conducted by Badran in her 
thesis entitled “Risk Analysis and Contract Management for Public Private Partnership 
Projects in Egypt.” The predefined risk allocation percentages are shown in Table 4 
(Badran, 2013). The risks were categorized into three groups: country risks, sector risks, 
and project risks. This is not the optimal choice, as it will not reflect the exact risk 
allocation percentages in the PPP contract; however, this option can be used when doing 
a quick check, or when the re-equilibrium value is already agreed upon and there is no 
need to look into the responsibilities and risk allocations in detail. In general, Table 4 
presents the three main categories and the different PPP risks with their percentage 
allocations and the party to which it is allocated. 
The risk allocation module also includes a section that studies the effect of 
certain risk occurrences on the different parts of the PPP valuation process. This will 
not only affect the PPP valuation process, but will also affect the financial model re-
equilibrium module. Risks are the main triggers of renegotiation, which means that the 
events leading to renegotiation should be studied thoroughly and assigned to their 
corresponding risks in order to define the bearer of such risk. The financial model re-
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Figure 8: The Risk Allocation Module Interrelation with the Other Modules 
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equilibrium module shall only account for a portion of the risks that are allocated to the 
public sector. Finally, the results are reported via the reports module. 
Table 4: Qualitative and Quantitative PPP Risks Allocation (Badran, 2013) 
#  Risk Factor  Private  
(%)  
Public  
(%)  
Both  
(%)  
Risk 
Allocation  
  Country Risks:      
1 Interest Rate Fluctuation  32 12 56 Both  
2 Inflation  24 20 56 Both  
3 Foreign exchange fluctuation  36 16 48 Project 
Dependent  
4 Public Credit  20 28 52 Both  
5 Political Risk  28 8 64 Both  
6 Nationalization/expropriation  56 16 28 Private  
7 Government corruption  60 12 28 Private  
  Sector Risks:      
8 Price Change  40 8 52 Both  
9 Revenue Risk  36 24 40 Project 
Dependent  
10 Market competition  36 12 52 Both  
11 Supply and demand  24 16 60 Both  
12 Change in Market demand  12 24 64 Both  
13 Legislation changes  32 20 48 Project 
Dependent  
14 Change in tax regulation  36 20 44 Project 
Dependent  
15 Government policy  24 16 60 Both  
16 Political/Public opposition  12 24 64 Both  
17 Swings in Public Opinion  20 16 64 Both  
18 Regulatory/Contractual Risk  44 8 48 Project 
Dependent  
19 Government Intervention  40 16 44 Project 
Dependent  
20 Poor public decision making 
process  
36 24 40 Project 
Dependent  
21 Inadequate law and supervision 
system  
36 32 32 Project 
Dependent  
22 Lack of supporting infrastructure  12 20 68 Both  
  Project Risks:      
23 Operation cost overrun  76 0 24 Private 
24 Inability of concessionaire  36 8 56 Both  
25 Subjective Project evaluation 
method  
24 12 64 Both  
26 Insufficient project finance 
supervision  
44 4 52 Both  
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27 Performance Security Risk  56 4 40 Private  
28 Permits Risks  20 8 72 Both  
29 Delay in project approvals/permits  20 16 64 Both  
30 Dispute resolution  28 0 72 Both  
31 Imperfect contract documents  20 16 64 Both  
32 Deficiency of design  32 12 56 Both  
33 Quality Assurance  36 8 56 Both  
34 Quality Control  32 8 60 Both  
35 Latent Defect Risk  52 0 48 Private  
36 Project/operation changes  52 8 40 Private  
37 Inability of concessionaire  32 8 60 Both  
38 Provision of transformers, 
substations or backup power  
38 8 56 Both  
39 Construction Risk  76 0 24 Private  
40 Organization risk  64 0 36 Private  
41 Coordination risks  44 4 52 Both  
42 Land acquisition  22 32 56 Both  
43 Physical Obstacles that cannot be 
avoided  
28 20 52 Both  
44 Maintenance Risks  60 12 28 Private  
45 Access and delivery of site  32 20 48 Project 
Dependent  
46 Connection of Public utilities to 
boundaries of site 
20 36 44 Project 
Dependent  
47 Connection to boundary of Site of 
telephone lines and natural gas 
provision 
24 44 32 Project 
Dependent  
48 Labor unavailability  72 4 24 Private  
49 Material shortage  72 4 24 Private  
50 Third party delay/violation  56 0 44 Private  
51 Planning risks  52 12 36 Private  
52 Supervision, organization and 
control for inspection of 
Construction works  
68 4 28 Private  
53 Technological Risks  60 12 28 Private  
54 Completion risk  48 4 48 Project 
Dependent  
55 Sustainability Risk  24 32 44 Project 
Dependent  
56 Antiquities Risks  20 36 44 Project 
Dependent  
57 Unforeseen Weather conditions  56 4 40 Private  
58 Unforeseen geotechnical conditions  52 8 40 Private  
59 Force majeure  20 0 80 Both  
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4 . 2 . 3   The PPP Valuation Module 
The PPP valuation process is a very long and tedious process. In general, PPP 
project valuation is done through a financial model that incorporates all direct and 
indirect costs of the project; it also includes the revenues and contingencies. The 
purpose of the financial model is to come up with the service charge and the internal 
rate of return (IRR) of the project. The financial model also provides different forms of 
financial statements, such as the income statement, the cash-flow statement, and the 
balance sheet. Moreover, it calculates some financial ratios to help in evaluating the 
financial standing of the SPV. The financial model is quite important as it is considered 
the basis of any adjustments through the lifecycle of the PPP contract. 
 Xu et al developed a pricing equation that is used in the valuation process in 
their paper entitled “Developing a Concession Pricing Model for PPP Highway 
Projects.” Equation 1 is developed by Xu et al to calculate the PPP highway project 
price (Xu et al, 2012).  In this framework, Equation 1 is edited to suit all types of PPP 
projects. Some symbols are changed for the ease of notation as shown in Equation 3. 
The PPP price at a certain point in time is the summation all the cash in and cash out 
flows of the project. The equation considers only the items that will have as significant 
effect on the PPP value and ignores minor items.  
The cash in items are the operation income (OI) and the government subsidies 
(GS), while the cash out items are the capital expenditure (Capex), the loan principle 
(LP), the loan interest, which is the loan balance (LB) multiplied by the loan interest 
(Li), the operation cost (Opex), and taxes (T). All the above costs and revenues are 
discounted at a fixed interest rate (i) to get the present value of the PPP concession at 
time (t). The value of the PPP concession can be determined at any time along the 
construction period (T0) or the concession period (TC). 
In this framework, a benchmark is taken at the beginning of the construction 
period to calculate the PPP value. The above terms are adjusted to account for inflation 
as per the PPP contract terms. Finally, the internal rate of return (IRR) is calculated for 
the free cash flow by equating Equation 3 to zero and solving for the interest rate, which 
will be the IRR. 
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Figure 9 shows the relationship between the PPP valuation module and the other 
modules. The inputs of the PPP valuation module are taken from the user-interface 
module and the risk allocation module. The outputs of the PPP valuation module are 
used in the scenarios development module and the reports module. 
The inputs coming from the user-interface module are the start and end dates of 
the project, the concession period, the contractual construction period, the interest rate 
that will be used to discount the different cash flows, the base inflation rate used in the 
contract, as well as the initial distribution along the lifecycle of the project of the capital 
expenditure distribution (Capex), the operation income distribution (OI), the 
government subsidies distribution (GS), the loan principle distribution (LP), the loan 
balance distribution (LB), the loan interest (Li), the operation cost distribution (Opex), 
taxes distribution (T) and the output quantity distribution (Q). The above distributions 
should be identical to the ones in the base financial model of the PPP concession to 
reflect the same internal rate of return in the contract. Moreover, the risk allocation 
module will also affect the PPP valuation module by affecting the cost of contingency 
added to the above equation. 
 
Equation 3: PPP Valuation Equation 
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The scenarios development module uses the base concession value in its 
calculations of the different re-equilibrium scenarios, as will be explained later in this 
chapter. Finally, the PPP valuation module results will be reported via the reports 
module. 
 
4 . 2 . 4   The Financial Model Re-equilibrium Module 
During the lifecycle of a PPP, which tends to be very lengthy compared to 
conventional procurement methods, many events may arise that result in the need for 
re-equilibrium or contract renegotiation, such as variation orders, unforeseen risks, or 
refinancing gains. The only way to reflect those changes on the PPP value is by 
constructing a re-equilibrium model similar to the financial model but adding the cost 
and time impact of those events. 
Figure 10 shows the financial model re-equilibrium module’s relationship with 
the rest of the framework modules. The financial model re-equilibrium module is 
similar to the PPP valuation module as it gets its inputs from the user-interface module 
and the risk allocation module, and the outputs go to the scenarios development module 
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Figure 9: The PPP Valuation Module Interrelation with the Other Modules 
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and the reports module, as well. However, the inputs of the PPP valuation module are 
different than the ones for the financial model re-equilibrium module. For instance, the 
concession period (TC) is not an input, as it cannot be changed before agreeing on 
choosing the scenario that corresponds to adjusting the concession period. Moreover, 
the interest rate (i) remains constant in order to compare the present value obtained from 
the PPP valuation model to the present value obtained from the financial model re-
equilibrium module. 
The inputs coming from the user-interface module are the actual start and actual 
end dates of the project, the re-equilibrium date (RD) that the scenarios are calculated 
with reference to, the actual construction period (T0), the actual inflation rate, and the 
updated distribution along the lifecycle of the project of the capital expenditure 
distribution (Capex), the operation income distribution (OI), the government subsidies 
distribution (GS), the loan principle distribution (LP), the loan balance distribution 
(LB), the loan interest (Li), the operation cost distribution (Opex), taxes distribution 
(T), and the output quantity distribution (Q). However, this updated distribution shall 
reflect the impact of the events that led to renegotiation of the contract. This is the role 
of the risk allocation module, as it is important to note that the updated distributions 
shall only include the portion of the risks allocated to the public sector, for the public 
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sector has already waived the other risk portions to the private sector as per the PPP 
concession contract. Equation 3 shall be used again but with the updated values rather 
than the base values to determine the updated concession value. Then, Equation 3 is 
equated to zero in order to obtain the updated rate of return (IRR) that reflects those 
changes. Finally, the outputs of the financial model re-equilibrium module are used in 
the scenarios development module and reported in the reports module, as will be 
explained later in the chapter. 
 
4 . 2 . 5   The Scenarios Development Module 
In order to gain the financial model re-equilibrium back, certain actions should 
be taken. The commonly used re-equilibrium scenarios in PPP are paying a lump sum 
amount to the private sector, increasing the service charges, increasing the concession 
period, or a combination of the one or more of the above. The sole aim of the 
renegotiation process is to maintain the investors’ initial IRR constant. Figure 11 
illustrates the relationship between the scenarios development module and the other 
modules. The scenarios development module inputs come from the user-interface 
module, the PPP valuation module, and the financial model re-equilibrium module, 
while the outputs go to the scenarios selection module and the reports module. 
Scenarios 
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Figure 11: The Scenarios Development Module Interrelation with the Other 
Modules 
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The inputs coming from the PPP valuation module and the financial model re-
equilibrium module are the present value of the PPP concession value and the PPP 
updated concession value at the start date of the PPP project, respectively. The 
difference between the present value of the PPP concession value and the PPP updated 
concession value is the re-equilibrium payment that is the basis for the different 
scenarios development process.  
In case of positive re-equilibrium payment, it means that the public sector shall 
compensate the private sector. The opposite is also true. In case of a negative re-
equilibrium payment, it means that the private sector shall compensate the public sector. 
Furthermore, in the case of a negative re-equilibrium payment, three scenarios of the 
four scenarios shall actually not be applicable: paying a lump sum amount to the public 
sector; decreasing the concession period; and the fourth scenario which is the 
combination between the other scenarios. This is because the payment of a lump sum 
amount from the private sector to the public sector shall distort the private sector cash 
flow. Decreasing the concession period is not allowed due to the obligations the private 
sector may have towards third parties until the end of the concession period. Moreover, 
in PPP projects where the private sector is directly paid by the service users, the fourth 
scenario which is decreasing the PPP payment may also not be applicable. For example, 
in the case of transportation projects, the private sector cannot decrease the toll, as it 
will create a market distortion. 
The re-equilibrium date (RD) is considered the base date of the calculations of 
the different scenarios. The first re-equilibrium scenario is to pay a lump sum amount 
to the private sector. The re-equilibrium date (RD) is considered the date upon which 
the lump sum payment shall be made. Hence, in order to calculate the required lump 
sum payment, the future value of the difference between the present value of the PPP 
concession value and the PPP updated concession value is obtained at the re-
equilibrium date using  Equation 4, where, in this case, (FV) is the lump sum payment, 
(PV) is the difference between the present value of the PPP concession value and the 
PPP updated concession value at the beginning of the project, (i) is the fixed discount 
rate, and (N) is the number of periods between the start date of the project and the re-
equilibrium date. 
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The second re-equilibrium scenario is to increase the service charges. This 
scenario depends on the nature of the payment in the contract. The user-interface 
module supplies this module with the payment mechanism used (user charges, usage 
payments, or availability payments), the amount of the periodic payment, and the 
frequency of payment (i.e., annually, semi-annually, quarterly, etc.). The adjusted value 
of the service charge is obtained using Equation 5, where the (A) is the adjusted amount, 
(PV) is the lump sum payment at the re-equilibrium date obtained in the first scenario, 
(i) in this case is the fixed discount rate divided by the number of periods in one year 
in order to get the effective discount rate, and (N) is the number of periods, which equals 
the number of periods from the re-equilibrium date until the end date of the project. 
Finally, the adjusted amount is then added to the original payment amount to be the 
adjusted periodic payment, which is to be paid starting from the re-equilibrium date 
until the end of the concession period. 
 
The third re-equilibrium scenario is to increase the concession period. This is 
done through a number of steps. The first step is to calculate the future value of the 
difference between the present value of the PPP concession value and the PPP updated 
concession value at the end date of the project using Equation 4, where, in this case, 
(FV) is the required payment at the end date of the project, (PV) is the difference 
between the present value of the PPP concession value and the PPP updated concession 
value at the start date of the project, (i) is the fixed discount rate, and (N) is the number 
of years of the concession period. The second step is to get the required number of 
periods after the concession period for this amount to be paid with an extension of the 
service payment. This is done by using Equation 5, where the (A) is the project initial 
Equation 4: Future Value given Present Value 
Equation 5: Annuity given Present Value 
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service charge, (PV) is future value calculated in the previous step, (i) in this case is the 
fixed discount rate divided by the number of payments in one year in order to get the 
effective discount rate, and (N) is the additional number of periods required to reach re-
equilibrium after the end date of the project. Finally, the additional number of periods 
are added to the original concession period in order to obtain the adjusted concession 
period. 
The fourth scenario is a combination of any two of the above scenarios. The 
user-interface module provides the exact combination required for the fourth scenario 
after getting the reports for the three scenarios. This is to allow the framework to avoid 
breaking the maximum values required of the above scenarios. For instance, there can 
be a maximum number of years that the concession period cannot exceed. In order to 
add this limitation to the framework, the user-interface module shall provide the 
scenarios development module with a combination for the fourth scenario, which 
includes the increase of concession period scenario. This input shall be limited to fix 
the concession period to a value between the original concession period and a maximum 
value defined by the user-interface module. This process serves to exclude the 
unwanted or unfeasible re-equilibrium scenarios. Finally, the outputs of this module, 
which are the three scenarios report and the final scenarios report, will be used in the 
scenarios selection module and the reports module. 
 
4 . 2 . 6   The Scenarios Selection Module 
In the scenarios development module, four re-equilibrium scenarios are 
originated: paying a lump sum amount to the private sector, increasing the service 
charges, increasing the concession period, or a combination of one or more of the above. 
The scenarios selection module is the module in which the choice between the four re-
equilibrium scenarios is made. Figure 12 shows the relationship between the scenarios 
selection module and the other modules. The inputs of the scenarios selection module 
are from the user-interface module and the scenarios development module. The outputs 
of the module go to the reports module and the sensitivity analysis module. The goal of 
the scenarios selection module is to account for the interests of the stakeholders of the 
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PPP project, mainly the public sector and the private sector, when selecting the 
renegotiation outcome scenario. 
 
The scenarios development module provides the scenarios selection module 
with the final four re-equilibrium scenarios, while the user-interface module supplies 
this module with the criteria and their corresponding sub-criteria, based on which the 
selection is to be made. In order to evaluate each scenario, a score shall be given to each 
scenario. The scenario score is calculated using the weighted sum model. This model 
suggests that each scenario to have a set of criteria which have a relative importance to 
each other. The scenario score shall equal the summation of the weight of importance 
for each criteria multiplied by its value as shown in Equation 6. (x) is the number of 
alternatives of scenarios, (i) is the number of main criteria, (j) is the number of sub-
criteria of a certain main criteria, (W) is the weights and (R) is the rankings.  
Equation 6: Scenario Score 
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Figure 12: The Scenarios Selection Module Interrelation with the Other 
Modules 
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 After inputting the criteria, the user-interface provides the scenarios selection 
module with the importance of each criteria with respect to the rest of the criteria for 
each of the four scenarios. Moreover, it also supply the scenarios selection module with 
the importance of sub-criteria with respect to the rest of the sub-criteria of the same 
category for each of the four scenarios. Then, the scenarios selection module determines 
the weights of the criteria and sub-criteria with respect to the different re-equilibrium 
scenarios. The approach is to draw matrices for the main criteria and each of the sub-
criteria categories in which the top row is the criteria or the sub-criteria and the rest of 
the matrix is a mirror image. Decision matrices were invented by Stuart Pugh (Pugh, 
1991). An example of the decision matrix is shown in Figure 13. The importance of the 
criteria with relative to the other criteria is taken from the user-interface module and 
inserted in the respective position in the matrix. In order to obtain the weight of each 
criteria, the number of occurrences of each criteria is counted, and the weights are 
calculated by dividing the number of occurrences of each criteria over the total number 
of occurrences of all of them. It is important to note that the total number of weights of 
the criteria or a certain sub-criteria of one category should equal to one. 
 
The above exercise is done for the criteria and the sub-criteria for each one of 
the four scenarios, as the weights may differ when dealing with making a lump sum 
payment or just extending the concession period. After obtaining the weights of the 
criteria, rankings are taken via the user-interface module. Separate rankings are required 
from both the public sector and the private sector in order to reflect their interests and 
preferences. Using the weighted sum model, eight scenario scores are calculated: four 
for the four re-equilibrium scenarios from the perspective of the public sector, and the 
other four for the four re-equilibrium scenarios from the perspective of the private 
sector. The outputs of this step are the best scenarios or the scenarios with the highest 
scores from the public sector perspective and the public sector perspective. Then, 
Figure 13: Scenario Selection Criteria Decision Matrix (Pugh, 1991) 
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averages of the private sector rankings and the public sector rankings are taken to 
calculate the four re-equilibrium scenarios scores from the perspective of both parties. 
The scenario with the highest score is marked to be the best scenario from the 
perspective of both prospective.  
  
4 . 2 . 7   The Reports Module 
The reports module is the module in which all the results of the previous 
modules are combined and processed in order to be directed to the user-interface 
module. The reports module allows the decision maker to look at the broader picture 
rather than looking at detailed calculations. Figure 14 illustrates the relationship 
between the reports module and the other modules of the framework.  
The reports module provides risk allocation charts showing the portions of the 
risks allocated to the public sector, the portions of the risks allocated to the private 
sector, and the portions of the risks shared between the both. The reports module also 
provides the user-interface module with a report showing the original PPP concession 
value versus the PPP updated concession value. In addition, the reports module presents 
the four re-equilibrium scenarios: paying a lump sum amount to the private sector 
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Figure 14: The Reports Module Interrelation with the Other Modules 
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scenario, increasing the service charges scenario, increasing the concession period 
scenario, and a combination of any two of the above scenarios. Then, the reports module 
presents the best scenario from the perspective of the public sector, followed by the best 
scenario from the perspective of the private sector, and finally the best scenario from 
the perspective of both. 
The following reports are three decision tree reports, each presenting the 
expected monetary value (EMV), which is another way of calculating the scenario 
score. The trees start with a decision node, with the four alternatives of scenarios 
branching from it. Each scenario has branches presenting the criteria, and each criteria 
branches into the sub-criteria. The branches have the weights, and the rankings are 
assigned at the end of the tree branches.  
The reports module then develops the risk profile graphs as it shows the risks 
and opportunities of choosing one scenario over the other. The first graph is the 
probability chart, which shows the effect of changing the weights of the criteria and 
sub-criteria on the scenario scores, reflecting the probability of choosing a certain 
scenario over the other. The second graph is the cumulative graph, which presents the 
ranges of values that the scenario can yield versus the corresponding probabilities or 
weights. A statistical summary report is then formulated to provide some statistics about 
all the ranges of possible outcomes of the decision tree. 
The following reports are called the policy suggestion reports, which help the 
decision maker look at the broader picture when making his decision. The decision table 
report provides the “benefit of correct choice,” which is basically the difference 
between the value of the highest scenario score and the lowest one. This helps in 
showing whether the scenario scores are close or not. The policy suggestion reports 
also include an optimal tree report that shows the path of the optimal decision only. 
 
4 . 2 . 8   The Sensitivity Analysis Module 
Figure 15 shows the relationship between the sensitivity analysis module and 
the framework modules. The sensitivity analysis module inputs come from the 
scenarios selection module, and it presents its outputs to the user-interface module 
directly. The sensitivity analysis is another form of the risk profile graphs of the reports 
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module. It shows the effect of changing certain inputs on the final output of the module. 
The sensitivity analysis is performed to study the effect of changing the criteria rankings 
on the scenario scores. 
 
As stated above, the inputs of the sensitivity analysis module are the ranks 
presented in the scenarios selection module. The criteria rankings can be any integer 
number between one and five. The sensitivity analysis is done by changing the value of 
the rankings of the sub-criteria from one to five, and the output is observed. This is 
done for the sub-criteria that have the highest rankings; moreover, it is performed 
individually for each sub-criteria, then a double-sensitivity analysis is executed to 
measure the effect of changing two sub-criteria at the same time. A strategy graph is 
also provided to measure the sensitivity of changing the rankings of a sub-criteria on 
all the alternatives or the scenarios to determine the area of decision within the desired 
output. A tornado graph and a spider graph are used to present the results of the 
sensitivity analysis. 
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Figure 15: The Sensitivity Analysis Module Interrelation with the Other 
Modules 
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CHAPTER 5 : RESULTS ANALYSIS, VERIFICATION 
AND VALIDATION 
5 . 1   The Waste Water Treatment Plant (Case Study) 
In this research, a case study of a wastewater treatment plant in Egypt is applied 
to the prototype model in order to validate the proposed framework. The case study of 
concern is a design, build, finance, operate, maintain, renew, and transfer of ownership 
PPP contract (DBFOMRT). It has many forms of PPP agreements, which makes it very 
suitable to be used as a validation for the suggested framework.  
The concession period is set to be 20 years, divided into two years of 
construction and 18 years of operation. The plant is to produce 250,000 cubic meters of 
treated domestic wastewater per day as per the required specifications in the contract. 
The Service Provider is to receive periodic availability payments in exchange for the 
sewage treatment, which is the payment mechanism of this PPP contract. The location 
of the wastewater treatment plant, the SPV name, the consultants’ and advisors’ names 
are concealed due to confidentiality. The Owner or the Grantor of the wastewater 
treatment plant is the Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Development 
(MHUUD), while the tender documents were issued by the New Urban Communities 
Authority (NUCA) with the assistance of the PPP Central Unit of the Ministry of 
Finance.  
In Egypt, the PPP Central Unit is part of the Ministry of Finance and deals with 
all PPP projects in Egypt. The goal of the unit is to assist the different ministries during 
the tender process and along the lifecycle of the PPP projects in order to promote the 
PPP initiative in Egypt. The unit is also engaged in developing PPP project proposals, 
forming the financial and legal documents of the projects, announcing new PPP projects 
to the private sector, reviewing the bids, and providing feedbacks and solutions to any 
obstacles facing the PPP projects. In other words, the PPP Central Unit is the unit 
forming the standard practice for the PPP projects. 
The pre-qualification documents of the project were issued in December 2007, 
and five bidders were qualified for the bid. The final tender documents were issued in 
February 2009. The tender was based on a competitive bidding process including a 
technical bid and a financial bid. The project is tendered under Law no. 89 for 1998, 
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which is the Law on Organizing Tenders and Bids for Public Procurement and its 
Executive Regulations, issued by virtue of Decree no. 1367 for 1998 by the Ministry of 
Finance. The contract was issued in June 2009, before the PPP law was issued. In 
August 2010, the People’s Assembly of Egypt approved Law no. 67 for Partnerships 
with the Private Sector in Infrastructure Projects and Public Utilities. The Executive 
Regulations of the law were issued through Prime Ministerial Decree no. 238 for the 
year 2011. 
One of the Conditions Precedent for the Contract to come into effect is to submit 
a financial model that has all the calculations and computations of the financial bid. The 
components of the financial model is explained in detail in Chapter Three of this 
research. Typically, the financial model should include detailed calculations of all the 
costs, including direct and indirect costs and contingencies, and the revenues of the PPP 
project. The outputs of the model usually includes the different financial statements and 
the financial indicators. 
The Independent Financial Expert is a third party that reviews the base financial 
model and prepares any amendments based on that model when an event arises that 
harms the Return on Equity value as per Contract Clause 34.4: Mechanisms of 
Compensation for Contract Re-equilibrium. This Clause states that the method of 
calculating the re-equilibrium value shall be to keep the internal rate of return of the 
Service Provider, or the SPV constant. Then, the re-equilibrium scenarios are defined 
in Contract Clause 34.5: Forms of Compensation, including adjusting the PPP payment, 
paying a lump sum amount, or a combination of the above. 
In the wastewater treatment plant contract, it is stated that the Independent 
Financial Expert is the one to determine the form of compensation; however, in case of 
dispute, the issue shall be referred to the Partnership Committee. According to Contract 
Clause 24, the Partnership Committee consists of five representatives who belong to 
the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA), the Construction Authority for 
Portable Water and Wastewater, the Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban 
Development (MHUUD), the PPP Central Unit, and the Egyptian Water, Wastewater 
Regulatory, and Customer Protection Authority (EWRA), as well as another five 
representatives belonging to the Service Provider (SPV.) The Partnership Committee is 
not a third party, as it consists of both involved parties, which seems not to be the best 
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way to deal with disputes. The PPP contract renegotiation process needs to be supported 
and enhanced in order to avoid disputes. To achieve this, the suggested framework 
provides guidance through the PPP contract renegotiation process by defining the exact 
events leading to the renegotiation of the PPP contract and the party responsible for 
each event. The framework also helps in formulating the re-equilibrium scenarios; 
moreover, it defines the optimal scenario to suit all parties. The framework results are 
unbiased and robust, therefore enhancing transparency and mutual trust between the 
parties. 
 
5 . 2   Results Analysis 
In this case study, a call for a contract re-equilibrium was raised by the Service 
Provider in April 2013 due to a delay in the operation start date. The public sector, 
represented by the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA), was responsible for 
the delay in delivering the influent water, which was the wastewater to be treated by 
the plant. Moreover, NUCA was also delayed in providing the effluent pumping station. 
The above case was presented to the Independent Financial Expert (IFA) of the project. 
The same case will be applied to Decision Support System model in order to validate 
the suggested model and compare the results obtained with the outputs of the IFA. 
 
5 . 2 . 1   The User-Interface Module 
The user-interface module interacts with the user dynamically along the 
different stages of the Decision Support System model, as it is linked to almost all of 
the other modules. It provides the inputs for some modules while receiving the output 
from the others to present them to the user. The welcome screen of the model consists 
of the model name “PPP Contract Renegotiation DSS” and its version, as shown in 
Figure 16. By clicking into anywhere in the screen, the user is directed to the second 
user-interface page, shown in Figure 17, to start inputting the data that will be used in 
the following modules.  
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Figure 16: DSS User-interface no.1 
Figure 17: DSS User-interface no.2 
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The first set of data required are the project name, the PPP contract type, the 
risk matrix used, the payment mechanism, the payment amount, and the payment 
intervals. The project name of the case study is the wastewater treatment plant; the 
actual name is concealed due to confidentiality. The contract type is a design, build, 
finance, operate, maintain, renew, and transfer of ownership PPP contract 
(DBFOMRT). The payment mechanism is availability payments in which service 
availability is the key condition for the payment. The service availability definition in 
the case study contract is to be able to deliver quarter of a million cubic meters of treated 
wastewater per day. The payment value is 32 million Egyptian Pounds (EGP) to be paid 
quarterly by the government to the private sector. As for the “risk matrix used” field, 
the user selects from a dropdown menu whether to use a default risk matrix or input a 
risk matrix as per the contract of the wastewater treatment plant, as shown in Figure 18. 
When the “user input” option is selected, a hyperlink appears on the right, marked with  
 
Figure 18: DSS User-Interface no.2' 
no. 1 
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arrow no.1, which directs the user to the risk allocation module in order to input some 
information with regard to the risks profile of the project, including all possible risks, 
their allocations, and their expected impact on the project valuation process. However, 
the default risk matrix is selected for the purpose of this case study, which is deduced 
from the literature review. The rest of the user-interface module shall be explained 
along with the following modules, for the model is to be explained in the right sequence. 
 
5 . 2 . 2   The Risk Allocation Module 
The risk allocation process in general is very important through the lifecycle of 
any PPP project, especially during the renegotiation of the PPP contract. Risk 
allocations and their impacts on Equation 3 are used in the different calculations in the 
model. They affect the valuation process of the PPP project, and at the same time, they 
are important for determining which risks should be accounted for when calculating the 
re-equilibrium value.   
The user input risk table and the default risk table have the same formatting with 
respect to the table columns and their headings. However, the default risk table has 
already been filled with data extracted from the literature review to be ready for use in 
case of quick access to the other modules in the model. On the other hand, the user input 
risk table is to be filled with the exact percentages of allocations as per the contract. 
The user input risk matrix is more accurate and recommended to be used when possible. 
Figure 19 shows the default risk table used in the Decision Support System prototype 
model. As shown in the figure, the first column contains a set of standardized risks, and 
the following column contains their typical allocations to the public sector, the private 
sector, or shared among them. The following three columns show the exact percentages 
of the risks allocations carried by the different parties or shared. This portion of the 
table is extracted from the literature review (Badran, 2013). The risks are then divided 
into three main risk categories: country-related risks, sector-related risks, and project-
related risks. An example of a country risk is macroeconomic risk, while an example of 
sector risk is market risk. The project risks are risks related to the nature of the project 
itself, such as permits risk.
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Figure 19: Risks Default Table 
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The column headings in the right half of the table start with “Impact.” This part 
of the risk table identifies which terms of the PPP valuation equation are affected when 
a risk materializes. This is important in order to study which part of the equation is 
going to be adjusted when calculating the re-equilibrium value of the contract if 
renegotiation is required, as will be shown later. Finally, for the purpose of the case 
study, the default risk table is used in the model as the exact allocation percentages are 
concealed due to confidentiality. 
 
5 . 2 . 3   The PPP Valuation Module 
After preparing the risk table, the user is referred to the third screen of user-
interface module by clicking the button at the bottom of Figure 19. The following screen 
is shown in Figure 20. This screen is for inputting the project payment information. In 
other words, it summarizes the financial model submitted to the government, which is 
part of the wastewater treatment plant contract. It has all the base values for the cash in 
Figure 20: DSS User-interface no.3 
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and cash out of the project. As shown in the figure, the wastewater treatment plant 
milestones are inputted by the user, including the project start date, the project end date, 
the construction period, and the concession period. The user is also asked to enter the 
re-equilibrium date, which is the effective date or a benchmark from which the re-
equilibrium scenario is calculated. For instance, if the increase in the availability 
payment scenario is chosen, the adjusted availability payment is assumed to be paid 
starting from the re-equilibrium date until the end date of the project. The interest rate 
is the rate at which the cash flows are to be discounted to obtain the concession value 
at the project start date. The producer price index (PPI) is used to adjust the cash flows 
to account for the effect of inflation, and it is fixed to equal 108 percent as per the case 
study contract. 
The user then clicks the “Input Payment Distribution” to the right of Figure 20 
in order to move on to the cash flow table and enter the values for the payment 
distribution as stated in the base financial model and the concession contract. The table 
used for the entry of the initial payments in and out cash flows is shown in Figure 21. 
The first column contains the equation parameters in order to insert the cash flows 
corresponding to each category. The header of the second column is set to the project 
start and continues by adding one month to each column until reaching the project end 
date. The table in Figure 21 is trimmed for illustration purposes. 
As stated before, this table is the summary of the base financial model in the 
concession contract. The complete schedule of payments is included in Appendix A. 
The first item in the table is the capital fund which is the investment costs paid by the 
private sector. The investment cost has two sources: debt and equity. In this case study, 
the equity constitutes 30 percent of the total investment cost, while the debt constitutes 
70 percent. The investment cost is paid during the construction period over the first two 
years of the concession period, as per the financial model. The schedule of payments 
from January 2010 until December 2011 is included in Appendix A. The investment 
cost includes the engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contract value of 
the wastewater treatment plant, which is a subcontract. It also includes the contingency, 
the advisors’ fees, the bid bond commission, the performance bond commission, 
general and administrative charges during the construction period, and any other pre-
operation expense. 
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Figure 21: Initial Payment Distribution 
Figure 22: Risk Factor Filtration 
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The second line in the table is the loan payments, which shows the profile of the 
debt portion of the capital expenditure. It is paid on a quarterly basis for the same period 
of the capital expenditure from January 2010 until December 2011.  
The third item is the operation income, which includes the availability payment 
paid by the public sector during the operation period from January 2012 until December 
2029. The operation income includes capacity charges, fixed operation charges, 
variable operation charges, sludge revenues, and interest income on the debt service 
reserve account (DSRA).  
The fourth item is the government subsidy, which in this case study is the 
electricity charges. The following items are the loan principle payments and the loan 
interest payments. The loan terms in this project are 15 years with a two-year grace 
period. The operation expenses include the operation and maintenance costs of the 
wastewater treatment and the sludge treatment. They also include the general and 
administrative charges during the operation period.  
The last two rows of the table are the taxes and the quantity of output produced, 
which is, in this case study, the amount of treated wastewater in cubic meters. Finally, 
the user is referred back to the user interface sheets by clicking on the button at the 
bottom of Figure 21. 
 
5 . 2 . 4   The Financial Model Re-equilibrium Module 
After inputting the initial payment information, the user is directed to the 
following screen of the user-interface module in order to enter the events that led to the 
contract renegotiation. Figure 23 shows the following user-interface screen. In this 
screen, the user is asked to enter the reasons for re-equilibrium. The user is also asked 
to select the corresponding risk factor to which the event belongs.  
In the wastewater treatment plant case study, the events that led to renegotiation 
of the contract were delays in the operation start date, a delay by the New Urban 
Communities Authority (NUCA) to deliver the influent water (the wastewater to be 
treated by the plant), and a delay by NUCA to provide the effluent pumping station. All 
the above risks belong to the risk category of connection of public utilities to site 
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boundaries. The user may prefer to enter three events all at the same time or separately, 
yet the model shall give the same results in all cases. 
In the background, those risk categories are filtered to consider the share of risk 
belonging to the public sector only. The filtration process is shown in Figure 22, where 
the model recalls the exact percentages of allocations belonging to a certain risk  
 
 
category and which part of the equation will be impacted. This part is not shown to the 
user, as the user will be directed to the following user-interface screen shown in Figure 
24. The message at the beginning of the screen is a variable, which changes to inform 
the user of the events that will be considered in the renegotiation process. The user is 
asked to re-enter the same information that is required in the PPP valuation module, but 
after reflecting the impacts of those filtered events on the payments values. The user is 
Figure 23: DSS User-interface no.4 
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directed to a screen similar to the previous module shown in Figure 25 to enter the 
updated distribution of the payments cash flows. 
The detailed cash flow is shown in Appendix A. One of the major changes 
between the base cash flow and the updated cash flow is the missing operation income, 
missing government subsidy, and missing output in the period from January 2012 until 
March 2013, as the new operation start date is April 1, 2013.  All cash flows are 
discounted up to January 2010, which is considered the benchmark or time zero.  
The discount rate (i) used is entered by the user in the screen shown in Figure 
20. Figure 26 shows a summary of the present values of the payment distribution items 
for both the initial values and the updated ones. Using Equation 3, the value of the 
concession at time zero for the base value is almost 37 million Egyptian Pounds, while 
the updated value is almost negative 161 million Egyptian Pounds. The difference 
between the two values is considered to be the re-equilibrium value at time zero, which 
is almost 198 million Egyptian Pounds.
Figure 24: DSS User-interface no.5 
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Figure 26: PPP Concession Value and Re-equilibrium Value at t = 0 
Figure 25: Updated Payment Distribution 
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5 . 2 . 5   The Scenarios Development Module 
As stated in previous sections, the common three scenarios used to regain the 
financial model equilibrium are paying a lump sum amount to the private sector, 
increasing the service charges, or increasing the concession period. The re-equilibrium 
value calculated in the previous module is to be used as the basis for calculating the 
values of the above three scenarios as well as an additional fourth scenario, which is a 
combination of any two of the above scenarios. All the calculations are done in the 
background, as the user will only get to see the final results of the scenarios. Figure 27 
shows the scenarios development tables. 
 
The first scenario is paying a lump sum amount to the private sector. The value 
of the lump sum payment is assumed to be paid at the re-equilibrium date, which is 
April 2013. Hence, the lump sum payment is calculated using Equation 4 where (i) is 
the discount rate ten percent, (N) is the number of periods from time zero (January 
2010) until the re-equilibrium date (April 2013), (PV) is the re-equilibrium payment at 
time = 0, and finally the (FV) calculated is the lump sum value to be paid by the public 
sector to the private sector, which is almost 270 million Egyptian Pounds. 
Figure 27: Re-equilibrium Scenarios Calculations 
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The second re-equilibrium scenario is adjusting the availability payment paid to 
the private sector. The model shall automatically select the payment mechanism used 
in the contract and calculate the additional payment required to reach re-equilibrium. 
The case study payment mechanism is availability payments, where the payment value 
is almost 32 million Egyptian Pounds paid quarterly to the private sector.  
The amount of the added payment is calculated via Equation 5 where the (A) is 
the adjusted amount, (PV) is the lump sum payment at the re-equilibrium date obtained 
in the first scenario, (i) in this case is the fixed discount rate of 10 percent divided by 
the number of periods in one year, which is four, in order to get the effective discount 
rate, and (N) is the number of periods from the re-equilibrium date until the end date of 
the project, which is four multiple of the difference in years between April 2013 and 
December 2029.  
The adjusted amount is then added to the original payment amount as shown in 
the scenario two calculations of Figure 27. Finally, the adjusted payment is almost 40 
million Egyptian Pounds, paid quarterly starting from the re-equilibrium date until the 
end of the concession period. 
Moreover, the third option to return the contract equilibrium is adjusting the 
concession period. This is calculated by first by using Equation 4 to get the future value 
of the re-equilibrium value at the end of the project in December 2029. (FV) in this case 
is the required payment at the end date of the project, (PV) is the difference between 
the present value of the PPP concession value and the PPP updated concession value at 
the start date of the project, or simply the re-equilibrium value, (i) is the fixed discount 
rate of 10 percent, and (N) is the number of years of the concession period, 20 years.  
This value is to be considered the present value in Equation 5. The (A) is the 32 
million Egyptian Pounds; the (i) is the effective discount rate per quarter. The equation 
is solved to get (N), which constitutes the number of periods remaining to be able to 
regain the financial model re-equilibrium. The maximum concession period for PPP 
contracts in Egypt is 30 years, as regulated by the Egyptian Law of PPP. However, in 
this case study, after adding the (N) obtained to the original concession period, the 
adjusted concession period exceeded 30 years, violating the law and making scenario 
three inapplicable. 
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 All the previous calculations are done in the background, as after the user enters 
the updated payment distribution in Figure 24, the user will be directed straight to the 
preliminary three re-equilibrium scenarios in Figure 29. The user will then be directed 
to Figure 28 in order to enter the elements of the fourth scenario. The user chooses a 
combination from the above three scenarios in order to calculate their values. In the 
case study, the Independent Financial Expert chose the fourth scenario to be a 
combination of adjusting the quarterly payments and extending the concession period. 
The user is also asked to enter a limitation to one of the two items selected. In this case 
study, the concession period is to be set to the maximum which is 30 years, as per 
Egyptian Law. 
 
 
The calculations of the fourth scenario are shown in Figure 27. The first row is 
the limitation which is what the user defines in the user-interface screen. The limitation 
shall always be a figure greater than the contractual value. Without entering a limitation, 
Figure 28: DSS User-interface no.6 
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there would be an infinite number of combinations for scenario four. The second row 
is the remaining value which is the difference between the limitation and the base value. 
In other words, it is the value that shall be transferred into the other form of the 
combination.  
In the case study, the combination chosen for the fourth scenario is to adjust the 
concession period and the capacity charge. The limitation for the concession period has 
been set to 30 years. The remaining value is 10 years. An adjusted quarterly payment 
is to be paid starting from the re-equilibrium date until the end of the 30-year adjusted 
concession period. In order to calculate the amount to be added to the base quarterly 
payment, the following steps should be followed. 
A new re-equilibrium payment should be calculated to deduct the value of the 
payments to be paid in the additional 10 years of the concession period. This is done 
using Equation 5 where the (A) is the 32 million Egyptian Pounds payments paid in the 
additional 10 years, (i) in this case is 10 percent fixed discount rate divided by four 
periods in order to get the effective discount rate, and (N) is the number of periods in 
the additional 10 years, which is 40, as the payments are paid quarterly. The (PV) 
obtained is discounted until the project start date.  
The (PV) is to be plugged into Equation 4 as the future value, (i) is the fixed 
discount rate of 10 percent, and (N) is 20. The (PV) obtained from Equation 4 shall be 
deducted from the re-equilibrium value at time zero to obtain the new re-equilibrium 
value, which shall be plugged into Equation 4 to obtain the (FV) at the re-equilibrium 
date, then Equation 5 shall be used to obtain (A), which is the adjustment that shall be 
added to the base capacity charge of the project. The adjusted payment in this case is 
almost 35 million Egyptian Pounds. The final set of scenarios are presented to the user, 
as shown in Figure 30. 
Finally, the four re-equilibrium scenarios, obtained from the model, are very 
close to the ones obtained by the Independent Financial Expert. One of the scenario’s 
value is almost identical to the IFE value, and the others do not exceed the IFC values 
by more than five percent. This is considered an acceptable range to validate the 
developed model.
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Figure 30: The Final Re-equilibrium Scenarios 
Figure 29: The Preliminary Re-equilibrium Scenarios 
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5 . 2 . 6   The Scenarios Selection Module 
The purpose of the scenarios selection module is to be able to identify the best 
scenario from the four re-equilibrium scenarios: paying a lump sum amount to the 
private sector, increasing the service charge, adjusting the concession period, and a 
fourth scenario with a combination of any two of the above scenarios. The aim is to 
maximize the satisfaction of both parties. In order to achieve this goal, a set of criteria 
should be defined in order to evaluate this degree of satisfaction. 
After the user is directed to the final set of scenarios developed in the previous 
module, shown in Figure 30, the user shall click the button at the bottom to enter the 
re-equilibrium criteria. The user-interface module presents the screen in Figure 31 for 
the user to enter the criteria in the first row of the table. The user may also enter sub-
criteria for each one of the criteria. The criteria main categories are economic, political, 
financial, project related, contractual, and policy. The economic criteria has to do with 
the economic situation of the country where the project is located. The sub-criteria for 
this category include inflation, general conditions of the country, stability of the 
exchange rates, and how the IRR is affected by all of the above. This is followed by the 
political criteria. The sub-criteria include long-term stability of the country, the current 
political situation, and the justice system in general. In addition, the financial criteria 
has to do with the party’s financial standing. It includes any current financial 
obligations required to be paid by the party, additional financial obligations, liquidity, 
the ratio between debt and equity, and the transparency of financial data. On the other 
hand, the project-related criteria is specific to the project nature, which includes original 
concession period, preferable concession period, and the level of complexity of the 
project. Moreover, the contractual criteria includes existence of regulator, risk sharing 
agreement, and how clear the termination clauses and re-equilibrium clauses are. 
Finally, the policy criteria is the general manner in which a certain party usually reacts 
to a certain situation. It includes the long-term business strategy, the likelihood of 
repeated business with a certain partner who is able to recognize the claim, and the 
experience of other partners. After the user enters the re-equilibrium criteria, the user 
shall enter scenario one priorities by clicking on the button in Figure 31. The user is 
then directed to the screen in Figure 32. 
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Figure 31: Criteria and Sub-criteria Priorities 
Figure 32: Re-equilibrium Criteria 
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The weights of each criteria and sub-criteria changes depending on its relation 
to a certain scenario, as explained in the methodology; hence, the user shall be directed 
to four screens, each one representing the weights for a specific scenario. The detailed 
priority tables are in Appendix A; however, Figure 32 shows a sample of the priorities 
of the criteria and the economic sub-criteria for scenario one. The user is asked to select 
from a dropdown menu which is more important among combinations of two criteria 
with respect to the selected scenario. The user has the right to select both criteria if he 
believes that they are equally important. In the background of the model, this 
information shall be transferred to form the decision matrix shown in Figure 33. The 
decision matrix is a mirror matrix with the top row identical to the first column, then 
the priorities are entered in the respective cells. The weights of the criteria or the sub-
criteria are calculated in the tables, shown also in Figure 33, by counting the number of 
occurrences of the criteria or the sub-criteria in the decision matrix and dividing it by 
the total number of occurrences of all the criteria or the sub-criteria to get a percentage. 
The weights for the economic, political, financial, project-related, contractual and 
policy with respect to scenario one are shown in Figure 33. 
After the user selects all the priorities for the four scenarios, the weights are 
ready to be used in the weighted sum model. As stated before, there exist separate 
weights for the criteria and the sub-criteria for each one of the four scenarios. However, 
the user is to enter only one rank for all the four. The user will be directed to the screen 
where he enters a ranking for the sub-criteria. A sample of the ranking sheet is shown 
in Figure 34. There exist two separate sheets for the private sector and the public sector. 
The sheet structure is shown in Figure 34, where the first column is the sub-criteria. In 
order to decide whether this sub-criteria is in favor of the party or not, the user looks at 
the risk allocations in order to see the broader picture. The following column is related 
risk, where the user chooses the risk that affects his decision from a dropdown menu. 
The risk allocation will automatically appear for the user to choose the suitable rank for 
a certain sub-criteria. The ranks are very suitable, suitable, neutral, unsuitable, and very 
unsuitable. The user selects the ranks from a dropdown menu. For the purpose of this 
case study, the weights and ranks are advised by governmental officials and private 
sector representatives. 
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Figure 33: Criteria and Sub-criteria Decision Matrix 
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Figure 34: Sub-criteria Ranking 
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After both the private sector and the public sector enter the ranks, twelve 
scenario scores are calculated: four from the public sector perspective, four from the 
private sector perspective, and four from the perspective of both. Using the weighted 
sum model presented in Equation 6, where (x) is the number of alternatives scenarios, 
which is twelve scenarios, (i) is the number of main criteria, which is six, (j) is the 
number of sub-criteria of a certain main criteria, which varies depending on the criteria, 
(W) is the weights, and (R) is the rankings. Figure 35 shows the calculations of the  
 
scenario scores in the bottom. The last column to the right, called the combined ranks, 
is the average of the private sector ranks and the public sector ranks. The scenarios with 
the highest scores are identified as the best scenarios for each party and the combined 
best scenario for both the public and the private sectors. After entering the ranks, the 
Figure 35: Scenario Scores Calculations 
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user is directed to the results directly without going into the calculation details. The 
results are presented via the user-interface screen shown in Figure 36. 
 
5 . 2 . 7   The Reports Module 
By clicking on the link at the bottom of Figure 36, the user will be directed to 
the reports module. The reports module includes all the outputs of the previous 
modules. The PPP concession value and the re-equilibrium value is also reported in this 
section; moreover, this section also includes the re-equilibrium scenarios reports and 
the best scenarios reports. The reports module also includes the risk allocation charts. 
The charts are located in Appendix A, yet a sample of the charts is shown in Figure 37. 
Risk allocation charts give a sense of which party is bearing the highest share of the 
risks. 
Figure 36: DSS User-interface no.7 
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The following set of reports is developed using Precision Tree 5.5 for Excel 
add-in. The following report is the decision tree showing the process of selecting the 
best scenario and calculating the expected monetary value (EMV). Three trees are 
formulated: one for the private sector best scenario, one for the public sector best 
scenario, and one for the best scenario considering both of them. The three charts are 
included in Appendix A. Three more charts are drawn to show only the optimal paths 
of the three trees, a sample of which is shown below in Figure 38. It belongs to the 
private sector decision tree. As shown previously, the second scenario is the scenario 
with the highest score, which means it is the preferable scenario for the private sector. 
Figure 38 shows the calculations of scenario two scores, where the first decision node 
represents the criteria of selection and the weights are shown at the arrows. The 
following decision nodes represent the sub-criteria, where the arrows have both their 
weights and the ranks, as well. 
The following set of reports are the risk profile graphs, which consist of a 
probability chart, a cumulative graph, and a statistical summary. The purpose of these  
Figure 37: Default Risk Allocation Chart 
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Figure 38: Private Sector Optimal Decision Tree 
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graphs is to show the risks and probability of selecting one scenario versus the other. 
The reports are included in Appendix A. A sample of the reports belonging to the 
private sector is shown below. Figure 39 demonstrates the first type of risk profile 
graph, the probability chart. The chart shows the different values for the four scenario 
scores and their probability of occurrence. For example, the probability that the scenario 
one score equals four is 46 percent, and the probability that the scenario three score 
equals three is 19 percent.  
On the other hand, Figure 40 demonstrates the cumulative probability chart, in 
which the chart demonstrates the probability of a scenario score equal or less than a 
certain value. For instance, the probability that the scenario two score is less than or 
equal to three is 30 percent, while the probability that the scenario four score is less 
than or equal to one is 13 percent. 
Figure 41 displays a statistical summary of the risk profile, which includes 
statistical information such as the mean, the standard deviation, the minimum and 
maximum values, the mode, the skewness, and the kurtosis. As shown in the figure, the 
expected value or the mean for scenario one is 3.54, for scenario two is 3.81, for 
scenario three is 3.43, and for scenario four is 3.52. From the expected value point of 
view only, scenario two is the optimum scenario to be selected by the private sector. 
Figure 42 displays another type of reports called the policy suggestion reports. 
Those reports help the management see the broader picture, not only the scenario with 
the highest score. The decision trees and the optimal decision tree in Figure 38 are 
considered part of this section of reports. Figure 42 shows optimal decision selected at 
each decision node and what is called “benefit of the correct choice.” Since the model 
has only one decision node, which is selecting the best scenario, the table has only one 
decision node, and its probability of occurrence is 100 percent. The benefit of the 
correct choice is the difference between the highest scenario score and the lowest 
scenario score. In the case of the private sector, the highest scenario score is a scenario 
two score which equals 3.81, and the lowest scenario score is scenario three which 
equals 3.43. The difference between the two scenarios is 0.38, which is the benefit of 
the correct choice in Figure 42. This helps the management get a sense of the whole 
spectrum when making their decision.
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Figure 39: Private Sector Probability Chart 
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Figure 40: Private Sector Cumulative Chart 
101 
 
Figure 41: Private Sector Statistical Summary 
Figure 42: Private Sector Policy Suggestion 
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5 . 2 . 8   The Sensitivity Analysis Module 
The sensitivity analysis module is the final module in the Decision Support 
System. The sensitivity analysis is applied to the ranks of the sub-criteria. As the ranks 
change from very suitable, which is denoted by the number five, to very unsuitable, 
which is denoted by the number one, the scenario scores are affected. Hence, it is 
important to observe how sensitive the scenario scores are to the change in the rank of 
a certain sub-criteria. The sub-criteria with the highest ranks are chosen for the 
sensitivity analysis; moreover, double sensitivity analysis is also performed to study the 
effect of changing two sub-criteria ranks at the same time. The sensitivity analysis 
reports are included in Appendix A. A sample of the sensitivity analysis reports is 
presented below. 
The sensitivity graph in Figure 43 shows the relationship between changing the 
ranking of the “exchange rates” sub-criteria and the expected monetary value (EMV) 
of the tree. The table on the right shows that if the ranking decreased by 80 percent, the 
EMV would decrease by almost six percent. In addition, if the ranking decreased by 20 
percent, the EMV would decrease by almost one percent. The difference between the 
Figure 43: 'Exchange Rate' Sub-criteria Rank Sensitivity Graph 
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highest EMV and the lowest EMV is 0.21, more than half the “benefit of correct choice” 
value, which denotes that the change of ranking of the “exchange rates” sub-criteria is 
rather sensitive to the selection of the best scenario process. 
Figure 44 is the second type of sensitivity report: the strategy region report. The 
strategy region report shows how sensitive each scenario score is to the change in the 
ranking of the “exchange rate” sub-criteria. The figure shows that for every possible 
value of the ranking of the “exchange rate” sub-criteria, scenario two shall always have 
the highest EMV. In other words, the result is not sensitive at all to the value of this 
variable. However, each scenario score is affected differently by the change of the 
ranking of this factor. For instance, the scenario four score is more sensitive to changing 
the ranking than the scenario one score, as the line is steeper. 
Figure 44: 'Exchange Rate' Sub-criteria Rank Strategy Region 
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Figure 45 shows the three sub-criteria: “long-term stability,” “exchange rates,” 
and “inflation.” The graph shows the EMV corresponding to each sub-criteria when its 
ranking varies from one to five. The first bar on the top is the “long term stability” sub-
criteria. This bar is noticed to be the longest bar among the three, which shows that the 
EMV is more sensitive to the change of the ranking than the other sub-criteria.  
 
The spider graph shown in Figure 46 confirms the same conclusion, as the line 
of the “long-term stability” sub-criteria is steeper than the other two lines, followed by 
the line of the “exchange rates” sub-criteria and in the end the line of the “inflation” 
sub-criteria. This concludes that the “long-term stability” is highly affected by the 
change in the ranks followed by the “exchange rates” sub-criteria and the “inflation” 
sub-criteria. 
 
Figure 45: Private Sector Tornado Graph 
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A two way sensitivity analysis is also performed to study the effect of changing 
the ranking of two sub-criteria at the same time on the expected monetary value of the 
decision tree or the preferred scenario. The two sub-criteria with the highest weights 
are selected, which are the “justice system” and the “long-term stability.” Figure 47 
shows the sensitivity graph for both sub-criteria with respect to the private sector EMV. 
The x-axis denotes the ranking of the “long-term stability” sub-criteria, the y-axis 
denotes the “justice system” sub-criteria, and finally, the z-axis denotes the EMV of the 
model. As shown in the figure and the attached table, as the rankings of the “justice 
system” sub-criteria and the “long-term stability” sub-criteria increase, the EMV 
increases, as well. 
  
Figure 46: Private Sector Spider Graph 
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Figure 47: Two Way Sensitivity Graph 
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Another type of two way sensitivity analysis is the strategy region. Figure 48 
shows the strategy region of the “justice system” sub-criteria and the “long term 
stability” sub-criteria for the private sector decision tree. The strategy region graph aims 
is to provide the user with every possible outcome for every combination of the sub-
criteria rankings. 
Figure 48: Two Way Sensitivity Analysis Strategy Region 
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For any combination of the rankings of the two sub-criteria, two possible 
preferred scenarios exist: either scenario one or scenario two. The probability of 
obtaining scenario one is higher than scenario two, as there exist a larger number of 
combinations resulting in scenario one than the number of combinations resulting in 
scenario two. It is also noticed from the graph that when the ranking of “justice system” 
sub-criteria approaches the maximum value and the ranking of the “long-term stability” 
sub-criteria approaches the minimum, scenario two becomes the optimum scenario, and 
vice versa. 
 
5 . 3   The Prototype Model Verification and Validation 
The verification of the model involves verifying the methods and techniques 
used in the Decision Support System prototype model; moreover, it includes verifying 
the outputs or the results obtained from the model. Calculations of the four scenarios, 
the weights of the criteria and sub-criteria, and the scenario scores were manually 
checked to avoid any numerical errors. Error messages were designed whenever 
possible to guide the users and avoid incorrect entries. An example of an error message 
is shown in Figure 49 where if the user enters risk allocation percentages to the public 
sector, the private sector, and shared that do not add up to 100 percent, the user is 
warned via an error message to adjust the allocations to avoid incorrect entry. 
 
Figure 49: Risk Allocation Percentage Error Message 
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In addition, sensitivity analysis is one of the tools that was used to verify the 
Decision Support System prototype model. The sub-criteria with the highest ranks were 
used in order to monitor their effects on the expected monetary value (EMV) or the 
preferred scenario score. The sensitivity analysis provided the possible outcomes of the 
Decision Support System prototype model in uncertain conditions by providing all the 
possible ranks and testing the output (EMV) for each of the ranks. One way and two 
way sensitivity analyses were performed to measure the effect of changing the ranks of 
separate sub-criteria and changing the ranks of two sub-criteria at the same time. The 
sensitivity analysis module provided a variety of sensitivity charts and strategy region 
reports. Finally, the results of the prototype model were verified. 
After verifying the results of the Decision Support System prototype model, the 
validity of the results is to be tested. One of the validation techniques is to compare the 
results to a real-life case and observe the deviation or the variance between the 
calculated results and the actual results obtained in real life. 
The Decision Support System prototype model validation was conducted by 
applying data from a real-life case of a contract renegotiation situation in Egypt. The 
case study used was a wastewater treatment plant. Although the case study used is a 
treatment plant, the model can be customized through the user-interface screens to work 
with many other PPP projects. Moreover, the contract type of the case study is a design, 
build, finance, operate, maintain, renew, and transfer of ownership PPP contract 
(DBFOMRT), which combines many types of the typical PPP agreements. This 
validates that the model can work with a variety of PPP contract types.  
The wastewater treatment plant in the case study faced unfortunate events which 
led to a delay in the operations start date. This was due to a delay by the New Urban 
Communities Authority (NUCA) in delivering the influent water (the water that will be 
treated) to the wastewater treatment plant, and a delay by NUCA to provide the effluent 
pumping station, which pumps the output of the treatment plant to the government 
network. 
The impact of the above events, which belongs to the public sector, was 
calculated in order to obtain the updated cash flow of the project. Then, the four re-
equilibrium scenarios — paying a lump sum amount to the private sector, increasing 
the service charges, increasing the concession period, or a combination of any of the 
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above — were calculated. Scenario three, which is increasing the concession period 
was not applicable because it exceeded the 30-year maximum concession period 
defined by the Egyptian Law of PPP. The four scenarios obtained from the model were 
compared to the scenarios that were developed by the Independent Financial Expert in 
real life. The results are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5: Scenarios Percentage Variance 
Scenarios Model Value Units Percentage Variance 
Scenario 1 270.34 M EGP 3.10% 
Scenario 2 40.36 M EGP/Quarter 0.40% 
Scenario 3 N/A Years N/A 
Scenario 4 34.5 M EGP/Quarter 4.80% 
30 Years - 
 
 In conclusion, the results obtained from the Decision Support System prototype 
model were very close to the ones obtained from the Independent Financial Expert of 
the Egyptian wastewater treatment plant. The percentage variance between the model 
calculated scenarios and the IFE obtained scenarios varied from almost zero percent in 
scenario two, which is adjusting the service charges, to a value not exceeding five 
percent in the other two. 
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CHAPTER 6 : CONCLUSION 
6 . 1   Overview and Contributions 
This research is concerned with the PPP contract re-equilibrium process, which 
seems to be an inevitability due to the long concession periods of the PPP contracts. 
The main objective of this research is to develop a tool that facilitates the lengthy and 
costly renegotiation process. In order to achieve this, a Decision Support System 
prototype tool has been developed with the aid of a number of computer programs, 
including Microsoft Excel 2013, Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) programming 
language, and the Precision Tree 5.5 for Excel add-in. These computer programs help 
in making the model user-friendly. In addition, the model is a multi-user model, in 
which both the public sector and the private sector are able to interact with its user-
interface screens. The prototype model consists of eight modules: a user-interface 
module, a risk allocation module, a PPP valuation module, a financial model re-
equilibrium module, a scenarios development module, a scenarios selection module, a 
reports module, and a sensitivity analysis module.  
The main contribution of this research is that it develops an interdisciplinary 
framework that facilitates the PPP contract renegotiation process. The research tackled 
different fields, such as construction, finance, and management. The methodological 
framework is applied as a Decision Support System prototype model. The purpose of 
the suggested framework is to enable all contract stakeholders to agree on a unified 
method of developing the different re-equilibrium scenarios and choosing the optimal 
scenario that suits all parties. This will facilitate the PPP renegotiation process, which 
will, in turn, encourage investors to enter PPP projects. The developed framework is of 
great benefit to project stakeholders, including the private sector, the public sector, and 
the users of the service. It saves time and money invested in lengthy negotiations, and 
it enforces transparency and mutual trust between the different parties by providing a 
tool that tremendously minimizes conflicts during the renegotiation process and defines 
clear steps to be followed in order to reach an agreement that will maximize the benefits 
for both the private and the public sectors. 
The verification of the model is done using three techniques. The first technique 
is through manual calculations of the four re-equilibrium scenarios, the weights of the 
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criteria and sub-criteria, and the scenario scores. The second technique is through error 
messages that appear to the user to guide him through the input process and avoid 
incorrect entries. The third technique is through the sensitivity analysis module, which 
verifies the output for all the possible ranks of the sub-criteria with the highest weights. 
On the other hand, the validation of the Decision Support System prototype model is 
conducted by comparing the results of the model with the case study. The case study 
used in the validation is a wastewater treatment plant in Egypt. The plant name is 
concealed due to confidentiality. The project contract type is a design, build, finance, 
operate, maintain, renew, and transfer of ownership PPP contract (DBFOMRT), which 
enabled the model to cover many aspects of the PPP approach at once. The operation 
start date of the plant was delayed due to a delay by the public sector to supply the 
influent water to the wastewater treatment plant and to provide the effluent pumping 
station. The impacts of those events were calculated and the base cash flow of the 
project was updated. The four re-equilibrium scenarios were then calculated and 
compared to the ones obtained by the Independent Financial Expert of the project. The 
results of the comparison were shown in Table 5, and the percentages variance from the 
real-life results were calculated. The comparison results are very close, relatively small 
percentage errors, which validates the prototype model. 
To sum up, the key features of the model are as follows. The Decision Support System 
prototype model engages the private sector in the decision making process. Moreover, 
the proposed framework enhances the transparency and the mutual trust. It saves time 
and money invested in lengthy renegotiation process. In addition, a default risk matrix 
is integrated in the risk allocation module, which allows a quick access to the following 
modules. A filtration tool is also provided to only add the effects of the risks which are 
allocated to the party of concern. The prototype model is validated by data obtained 
from a case study of a wastewater treatment plant in Egypt. 
 
6 . 2   Limitations 
The model of the research has been tested on only one case study in Egypt due 
to the limited number of PPP contracts executed in Egypt at the time of the research. 
This was the wastewater treatment plant built in Egypt using PPP method during the 
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production of this research. A larger number of case studies should be tested in order 
to utilize and validate the model on a wider scale. 
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